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Abstract
 At the inauguration of John G. Diefenbaker’s 1958 election campaign, the Prime Minister 
announced his ‘Northern Vision,’ a bold strategy to extend Canadian nationhood to the Arctic 
and develop its natural resources for the benefit of all Canadians. In some ways, the ‘Northern 
Vision’ was a political platform, an economic platform as well as an ideological platform. 
Invigorated by Diefenbaker’s electoral victory in 1958, the Department of Northern Affairs and 
National Development (DNANR) implementing the ‘National Development Policy’ in 1958 and 
announced the ‘Road to Resources’ program as a major effort to unlock the natural resource 
potential of the Canadian north. From 1958 to 1962, DNANR implemented additional northern 
development programs that planned to incorporate the northern territories along with Canada’s 
provinces, redevelop several key northern townsites, and stimulate mining activity across 
Northern Canada. As a result of serious government oversight and unforeseen developments, 
Diefenbaker abandoned his ‘Northern Vision’ and direction of northern development in 1962. 
Within the broader context of northern development over the past half century, the ‘Northern 
Vision’ produced several positive outcome which advanced the regional development of the 
Arctic. 
  This thesis will examine the ‘Northern Vision’ by evaluating Diefenbaker’s political  
platform, the development of the ‘National Development Policy,’ and the regional outcomes of 
key northern development projects initiated by the Diefenbaker administration. The ‘Vision’ was 
never anticipated to bring about immediate results for Canadians and many objectives  were 
eventually completed by consecutive Liberal governments. Moreover, the socioeconomic and 
military conditions of the Canadian north, at the time, appears to be significant factor in the 
implementation of this policy. This thesis also evaluates how natural resource operations 
propelled developments in territorial administration, housing, transportation, and fostered a 
wider participation of private enterprise across northern Canada. The ‘Northern Vision’ 
represents an overlooked period in the federal government’s administration of the Arctic and a 
critical event in the region’s development over the past fifty years. 
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Introduction
 Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker has long been regarded as an important figure in 
the development of the Canadian north. His ‘Northern Vision,’ a national policy of northern 
development, is considered a benchmark in the history of the federal government’s 
administration of the northern territories and an innovative attempt to incorporate the North’s 
regional economy into the nation.  The ‘Northern Vision’ holds particular significance in 
Canadian history as a political slogan and party platform for Diefenbaker’s campaign during 
the 1958 election; the same election where Canadians voted in the Conservative party with 
the then largest majority in the country’s history. 
 Given the strong mandate handed to Diefenbaker’s administration, ‘the Chief’ could 
have implemented whatever policies or programs he or his party desired. Canadian political 
scholars, in turn, have criticized the ‘Northern Vision’ for its limited achievements and failed 
implementation. By many accounts, the loss of interest in northern development, conflicts 
over Diefenbaker’s leadership, and escalating federal expenditures produced little actual 
development or construction in the Canadian north. The ‘Roads to Resources’ program is 
often cited by historians as an initiative that was ridiculed by Lester B. Pearson, suffered 
from government maladministration and poor financial oversight, as well as numerous 
logistical challenges of expanding transportation networks in the provincial and territorial 
norths. This study contends that the ‘Northern Vision’ was a successful policy that 
advanced political, economic and transportation imperatives in the Canadian north. It 
was unable, however, to reap the long-term rewards that Diefenbaker initially 
envisaged.
1
  The Canadian north is defined as the area above the 60th parallel and comprised of the 
Arctic and Sub-Arctic regions.  In some cases, this term has been extended to the Provincial 
norths as well.1 Isolation, vast distances, and harsh climate are all key attributes of the North, 
as are its abundant oil, gas, and mineral resources. Since the Second World War, the North 
has undergone dramatic and significant change.  Modernization, however, has met with 
resistance and half-hearted support from the federal government, despite its long-standing 
priority to encourage systematically regional economic development in the North.2 It has 
proven particularly difficult for the Canadian government to establish a stable economic base 
for continued development.  Private enterprise has often required the assistance of the public 
sector to develop and exploit northern natural resources. In the past, the federal government 
has fostered development in the North by constructing roads, highways, and railways, 
installing energy and hydroelectric facilities, building housing and infrastructure, carrying 
out negotiations with indigenous settlements, and implementing policies that attempt to 
better incorporate the North’s regional economy into the country as a whole. 
 The incomplete realization of Diefenbaker’s ‘Northern Vision,’ however, reflected his 
problems with political administration and his difficulty resolving bureaucratic and economic 
issues. The ‘Northern Vision’ presented an unprecedented set of expectations for the North. 
Although this development strategy and philosophy ignored critical human elements, it was 
essentially a national economic policy to stimulate the commercial exploitation of northern 
2
1 In this study, the Canadian north expressly refers to the Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories collectively.  
Specific mention will be made when referencing the Provincial norths, Arctic archipelago, Yukon Territory and 
Northwest Territory. 
2 From time to time, the government has shifted the emphasis of their northern policies from resource 
development to other areas of concern, ranging from military defence, threats to Canadian sovereignty, social 
welfare issues, and protection of the natural environment.
natural resources. Despite the resource development questions that the Diefenbaker 
government had to confront (including federal-provincial relations and environmental 
concerns), the immediate issue was the relationship between the state and the private sector. 
Private enterprise remained the primary beneficiaries of the ‘Northern Vision,’ not permanent 
residents of the North (including Indigenous peoples).  Echoes of Diefenbaker’s northern 
policies remain, with resource development a critical priority in the Harper government’s 
recent Arctic Strategy.3
 The ‘Northern Vision’ plays a confused role in our national consciousness. In its time, 
it was a populist and nationalist policy that excited Canadians voters but was relentlessly 
debated, questioned, and treated with uncertainty by the press and the public. The 
significance of Diefenbaker’s ‘Northern Vision’ cannot be measured simply within the strict 
period of his tenure as Prime Minister, nor its failure a simple reflection of Diefenbaker’s 
leadership and character. As mentioned, the ‘Northern Vision’ was a long-term economic 
policy. The capital expenditures, investments and construction operations associated with it 
were never anticipated to bring immediate results. The ‘Vision’ was intended to improve the 
general welfare of the North by laying an essential foundation for future economic 
developments. By the early 1960s, however, the loss of public confidence in Diefenbaker’s 
political administration seriously undermined the Government’s commitment to developing 
the Canadian north. Diefenbaker directed the attention of his government to more pressing 
concerns of foreign affairs, international military conflicts, and federal disputes.  As a result, 
3
3 Canada, Government of Canada, Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future, (Ottawa: 
Department of Indian Affairs, 2009) [http://www.northernstrategy.ca/cns/cns-eng.asp accessed 11 November 
2009].
serious analysis of the ‘Northern Vision’ has been overshadowed by other developments that 
rocked the national political scene in the 1960s. 
 Past scholarship provides only a partial and cursory examination of Diefenbaker’s 
‘Northern Vision.’ The attention that this topic has received relates only to its principal 
programs, the high-level of expenditures, and its fate amidst the complications of the 
Diefenbaker administration. In Northern Canadian historiography, a rather pessimistic 
attitude has developed, citing the persistence of the national policy and economic 
development strategies as having a marginal if not negative impact for northern development. 
The political historiography has emphasized the problems and issues of the Diefenbaker 
administration and not the terms or factors involved with the progress and implementation of 
the ‘Vision’ itself. The ‘Northern Vision’ was a national policy of resource development with 
wide-ranging implications not only for the North, but also was an attempt to offset the 
influence of commercial American interest, encourage greater financial participation of 
Canadians in their own economy, and foster a relationship between public and private 
enterprise. As such, it warrants careful attention.
 Historians and other commentators have considered the ‘Northern Vision’ a failed 
national policy of the Diefenbaker government and, in the case of the North, only one in a 
string of federal economic development policies that have failed over the last half century. 
When evaluated within the broader context of northern development, however, the positive 
impacts of the ‘Vision’ are also apparent.4  In my assessment, many historians have dismissed 
Diefenbaker’s ‘Northern Visions’ along with his administration that fell in 1963. But, in the 
4
4 Frances Abele, “Canadian Contradictions: Forty Years of Northern Political Development,” in Interpreting 
Canada’s North, eds. Kenneth S. Coates and William R. Morrison, (Mississauga: Copp Clark Pitman, 1989): 
310.
context of 1957 and 1958, Diefenbaker attempted to implement an economic policy centered 
on the North that would: draw Canada out of recession, distinguish his policies from his 
Liberal predecessors, and call upon the Conservative legacy of Sir John A. Macdonald’s 
‘National Policy’. In some ways, the ‘Northern Vision’ was a political platform, an economic 
platform as well as an ideological platform. Even so, this ‘Vision’ fell to the realities of 
Canada’s harsh political climate and also, failed to incorporate any concerns of the North’s 
indigenous peoples. At its time, the ‘Northern Vision captured the imagination of many 
Canadians: though incomplete, it did establish a foothold that eventually led to an expansion 
of northern transportation, and at minimum, demonstrated that federal expenditures and 
careful government planning could advance the general welfare and regional development of 
the North.  
 This study examines the development of the ‘Northern Vision’ - from philosophy, 
party platform, campaign promise to policy - and evaluates the challenges and complications 
that hindered northern development during the 1950s and 1960s. Particular attention is given 
to the government's apparatus for territorial administration, the Department of Northern 
Affairs and National Resources (DNANR), as well as the programs and policies of the 
‘Northern Vision’ itself. This thesis is a political history which details and critiques the 
development of national economic policy, the regional implications of federal policy and 
northern development. I am particularly interested in how the federal government 
conceptualized the North and how it conveyed this national economic policy to Canadians. 
While I focus on the development of the ‘Northern Vision,’ the regional and economic 
implications of this national policy are also considered. The central figure of this history, 
5
John G. Diefenbaker, intended the ‘Northern Vision’ to benefit all Canadians. As a national 
policy that emphasized the development of the Canadian north, it is crucial to understand the 
multiple dimensions, intended results, and potential economic benefits that its architects 
envisaged. In this thesis, I examine how the ‘Northern Vision’ acquired popular appeal in 
1958 and uncover what shortcomings attributed to the derision and criticism which it 
received in the years following.
 My central argument is that the objectives of the ‘Northern Vision’ were 
unattainable in a single term of government given the political and economic conditions 
of the Canadian north. Nevertheless, the broad objectives were achieved as a direct 
result of the work undertaken by the Diefenbaker administration, which had a 
significant and positive influence on the future development of the Canadian north.5 In 
addition, I challenge the assumption that the failure of the Diefenbaker government and the 
consequent loss of public support directly explain the underperformance of the ‘Northern 
Vision.’ Instead, the ‘Northern Vision’ should be understood as an innovative and expansive 
policy that sought to achieve a new level of development in the Canadian north – albeit one 
that was partially realized.
Prior to the ‘Vision,’ postwar administrations had largely ignored northern frontier 
development and limited construction operations were carried out by the American military 
to improve continental defence. As William R. Morrison noted, because Canadians have 
avoided active participation in the North, an area seen as vital to the defence of the continent, 
6
5 Given the limitations of this thesis, it is difficult to evaluate the implementation of the ‘Northern Vision’ policy 
as a whole, instead it is practical to examine the implementation of various program that were part of its 
platform and philosophy. It is important to acknowledge that there exists multifaceted and complex dimensions 
to this national economic policy, many of which were not intended to have a direct effect on the Canadian north.
Americans have tended to fill the vacuum.6 Historian Kenneth Eyre contends that the United 
States has traditionally thought of the North as a direction of strategic approach, while 
Canada “has historically viewed the North as a place that, however remote and unknown, is 
still an inherent part of the nation.”7 Canada accommodated the strategic perceptions of the 
United States and permitted access and military development under the guise of continental 
security. Following the defeat of the Diefenbaker government in 1963, subsequent 
administrations were able to improve the general welfare of the North thanks to the 
groundwork laid by Diefenbaker’s ‘Northern Vision.’ Canadian historiography has 
misrepresented the implications that the ‘Vision’ had for northern development, and in large 
measure, has ignored a pivotal chapter in the development of the modern North.
 Because the focus of this political history is the ‘Northern Vision,’ no claim is made 
to provide a comprehensive study of postwar developments in the North. A detailed 
departmental history of DNANR which examines its establishment, structure, and 
consecutive reorganization is needed, but this study merely seeks to provide background to 
demonstrate how NANR became an integral department within the Diefenbaker 
administration. An important theme of this study is the expansion of civil authority into the 
Canadian north. As political and economic interest in the region increased by the late 1950s, 
the Canadian government gave greater attention to the issues of permanent residents and the 
welfare of northern Indigenous peoples. Although the ‘Northern Vision’ ignored the rights of 
Indigenous residents, the proliferation of resource extraction projects and the development of 
7
6 William R. Morrison, “Eagle Over the Arctic: Americans in the Canadian North, 1867-1985,” Canadian 
Review of American Studies 18, (1987): 62-3, 69.
7 Kenneth Eyre, “Forty Years of Military Activity in the Canadian North, 1947-87,” Arctic 40(4) (December 
1987): 299.
transportation facilities had unintended consequences for remote Indigenous communities.8 
This study also addresses how private enterprise cooperated with the federal government in 
developing the Canadian north and examines the state incentives and policies which 
encouraged businesses and industries to invest in natural resource development. Finally, this 
study explores how Diefenbaker hoped the ‘Northern Vision’ would benefit the financial 
welfare of all Canadians, thus extending the nation-building tradition of Sir John A. 
Macdonald.
8
8 Some research on indigenous responses to specific resource projects during this period are available, however, 
material suggests that the government did not take comprehensive measures to consult with adjacent aboriginal 
communities. 
Historiography
 Since the Second World War, Canadians have both celebrated and condemned the 
North because of its sparse civil population, disconnect from modern change, the failings of 
government authority, and its underdevelopment. For Americans, the Arctic has been the 
open and undefended flank of continental defence.  It is a symbol of Canada’s reliance on the 
U.S. to defend against foreign attack and, accordingly, has generated questions about the 
integrity of our national sovereignty. Concurrently, the North is considered a treasure chest of 
natural resources for government and private enterprise to exploit for the benefit of all 
Canadians. All told, however, Canadians have depended upon the federal government to 
incorporate this regional society into the nation. 
 The scholarship of the ‘Northern Vision’ is a series of passing mentions and partial 
studies that have not evaluated the development of this policy.  Instead, scholars have 
deliberated on the failed implementation, shortcomings or character of Diefenbaker’s 
leadership. At first, scholars considered the ‘Northern Vision’ a peripheral political success 
that contributed to Diefenbaker’s overwhelming electoral victory in 1958. Later, political 
historians examined the policies of the Diefenbaker government but were indifferent towards 
the incomplete objectives of the ‘Northern Vision.’ More recently, scholarly interest in 
histories of native-newcomer relations, Aboriginal people and northern Canada has allowed 
for a growing scholarship that probes the impact of federal policies on the development of 
the Canadian north. As historians Kerry Abel and Ken S. Coates observed in their 2001 
historiographical study Northern Visions: New Perspectives on the North in Canadian 
History, this scholarship has focused on periods of enthusiasm for the North “typically 
9
centered on resource developments”.9 Nonetheless, a dedicated and extensive study of the 
‘Northern Vision’ has yet been produced, even though it represents a critical intersection 
between national politics and northern Canadian history. 
 Diefenbaker’s electoral successes in 1957 and 1958, and his toppling of the Liberal 
“government party” in Ottawa, has been well-documented as a turning point in Canadian 
politics. After the 1958 federal election, political and historical scholars were fascinated with 
this dramatic shift. Canadian political analyst John Meisel described the 1957 election as the 
“end of one epoch in Canadian politics” and the 1958 election had “opened a new era in 
Canadian politics and should be examined in that context.”10 Likewise, D. Owen Carrigan, in 
his survey of Canada’s electoral party platforms, suggested that Diefenbaker’s success during 
1958 campaign was a result of “his rapport with the people, his appeal to Canadian 
nationalism, his vision of northern development and his spellbinding oratory” which “all 
served to complete the Diefenbaker revolution and swept him into power with the biggest 
margin in the nation’s history.”11 In Pendulum of Power: Canada’s Federal Elections, J. 
Murray Beck, another political analyst and observer of Canada’s electoral history, described 
the 1958 election as unusual. “It was indeed a political revolution,” he questioned, “but was 
it to be revolutionary in its effect?”12 Beck credited Diefenbaker’s electoral success for its 
“truly national mandate” and the prime minister’s evocation of a “more positive response 
than his Liberal predecessors and, unlike them, he had won popular majorities in all 
10
9 Kery Abel and Ken S. Coates, Northern Visions: New Perspectives on the North in Canadian History, 
(Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2001):19.
10 John Meisel, The Canadian General Election of 1957, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962): vii.
11 D. Owen Carrigan, Canadian Party Platforms: 1867-1968, (Toronto: Copp Clark Publishing, 1968): 235.
12 J. Murray Beck, Pendulum of Power: Canada’s Federal Election, (Toronto: Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1968): 
323.
regions.”13  Beck claimed that the ‘Northern Vision’ lacked real political substance, and 
stated that “sometimes it seemed to be associated solely with the development of the 
Canadian north; sometimes it was ‘a vision of opportunity’ by which Canada could realize 
the benefits that her great resource made possible.”14 He also considered that the public’s 
enthusiasm for the ‘Northern Vision’ was not a significant factor in the election results 
because Canadian voters “could not be induced to show any great interest in issues.” Initial 
political analysis insisted that 1958 was a “luxury” election where the personality of 
Diefenbaker was the dominant factor.15 
 Journalist Peter C. Newman deplored the ‘Northern Vision’ as the political 
manifestation of Diefenbaker’s flair and charisma. His book, Renegade In Power: The 
Diefenbaker Years, is a critical account of the prime minister’s leadership, derived from 
Newman’s notes while a federal political correspondent for Maclean’s magazine.  Newman 
claimed that Diefenbaker’s national economic policy failed because it lacked any genuine 
political conviction from the onset. The ‘Northern Vision’ was a sensational campaign slogan 
that purported grand expectations for national development and economic benefits that 
resonated with Canadians during a nationwide economic recession. Newman claimed that, 
“despite the fact that the number of jobless Canadians had soared to new highs... Diefenbaker 
left the clear impression that he held the magic key that would solve the nation’s chronic 





16 Peter C. Newman, Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963): 72.
 Newman’s assessment of the ‘Northern Vision’ posed a serious attack on the 
Diefenbaker government's nationalist policies, and showed his indignation against 
Diefenbaker’s leadership. Newman’s main assertion was that the ‘Vision’ was a political 
manifestation of Diefenbaker’s difficulty in managing a majority government and contended 
that it failed. The outcomes of this northern economic policy never came close to the 
expectations expounded by Diefenbaker during the 1958 campaign, and the North was an 
inhospitable barren land where Newman believed little development could result.17 Newman 
claimed that high federal expenditures invested in northern development had not produced a 
single mine or caused a significant increase in oil and gas production, nor benefited the 
economic welfare of northern residents, and the abandonment of the proposed $75 million 
Arctic metropolis at Frobisher Bay was certainly a joke at the expense of Canadians.18 
Newman neglected to consider that the ‘Vision’ and the federal designs for the North would 
be impossible to implement in a single term of government. Diefenbaker hoped that 
successive governments would continue his strategy of northern economic development, 
aware that the benefits of his ‘Northern Vision’ would accrue over time.
  R.A.J. Phillips’ Canada’s North, published in 1967, gave Canadians a unique look 
into the process and administration of the northern territories. Phillips was a former civil 
servant with DNANR who observed how the ‘Northern Vision’ affected the Canadian north. 
His main focus was to evaluate the government’s role to advance the political, economic and 




excellent survey of postwar regional development, how federal policies were translated and 
implemented in the Canadian north, and the history of DNANR.
 In Canadian history, nationalist scholars who have studied the Diefenbaker 
government have held cursory interest in the ‘Northern Vision.’ Although historian and 
Conservative nationalist Donald G. Creighton initially approved of Diefenbaker and 
considered his ‘Northern Vision’ as an embodiment of key principles of Canadian Toryism, 
he believed the unsuccessful implementation of the northern strategy revealed the prime 
minister’s incapacity to lead a majority government. Creighton attempted to distinguish 
intellectual Conservative thought from Diefenbaker’s brand of popular Toryism after the 
Conservatives’ bold national economic policy failed. In his 1970 book Canada’s First 
Century, he wrote: 
In such conditions, what  might have been a spectacular advance turned out  to be a not 
unsuccessful holding operation. As a result of the ‘roads to resources’ programme, 
carried out  in conjunction with the provinces, over 4,000 miles of new roads were 
laid down in the Canadian northland...Very large sums of money were put  into the 
development  of natural resources, and the promotion and rationalization of primary 
industries.19
Creighton argued that the failure of Diefenbaker’s vision of national development resulted 
from his desperate attempt to avoid Canada’s economic takeover and domination of defence 
policy by the United States.
  Other political historians have been more forgiving of Diefenbaker’s political 
offenses and view the ‘Northern Vision’ as a limited political achievement. In J.L. 
Granatstein’s political survey of the Diefenbaker and Pearson era, Canada, 1957-1967, he 
acknowledged (in passing) the nation-building objectives of Diefenbaker’s ‘Vision’ as “one 
13
19 Donald Creighton, Canada’s First Century, 1867-1967, (Toronto: Macmillan, 1970): 314.
of his government's great successes.”20 Granatstein suggested that the ‘Vision’ was 
abandoned because of an “extraordinary concatenation of events in foreign policy, in the 
economy, in financial policy, and in defence questions” that preoccupied Diefenbaker as 
prime minister.21 Historians Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond and John English provide a 
brief yet fair explanation of the ‘Northern Vision’ in their survey history of postwar Canadian 
politics, Canada Since 1945: Power, Politics and Provincialism. The authors interpreted 
Diefenbaker’s northern development strategy as a dedicated policy of national ‘vision’ 
intended to progress “social welfare measure and to the equalization of opportunity and 
development throughout the dominion.”22 The authors briefly describe the national and 
regional economic objectives of the ‘Northern Vision,’ such as the ‘Roads to Resources’ 
program, the Pine Point Railway, and redevelopment plans for Frobisher Bay and Inuvik. By 
1963, however, the authors account for the failed implementation of the ‘Northern Vision’ 
due to a diminishing interest in northern development and a pressing emergency for 
Diefenbaker to resolve continental economic disputes, defence issues, and foreign military 
concerns.23
 More extensive investigation can be found in scholarly studies that have treated the 
‘Northern Vision’ as a distinct political process separate from the immediate political 
concerns of the Diefenbaker government. Patrick J. Kyba’s Alvin: A Biography of the 
Honourable Alvin Hamilton, P.C., offers an outstanding and comprehensive examination of 
14
20 J.L. Granatstein, Canada, 1957-1962, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986): 36-37,42.
21 Ibid., 42.
22 Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond and John English, Canada Since 1945: Power, Politics, and Provincialism, 
Revised Edition, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989): 186.
23 Ibid., 188.
the ‘Northern Vision’ that recognizes its complicated development and limited achievements. 
According to Kyba, the ‘Northern Vision’ was the public title for the ‘National Development 
Policy,’ an economic strategy developed collectively by Diefenbaker, Alvin Hamilton and 
Merril Menzies. Its original design dated back as early as 1953 when Hamilton, then leader 
of Saskatchewan’s Progressive Conservative party, advocated a platform that emphasized the 
development of Canada’s natural resources and the construction of highways that would 
access the North.24 Kyba suggested that the Conservatives’ political implosion in 1962 was 
associated with the Prime Minister’s refusal to implement the second stage of the ‘National 
Development Policy.’ As a result, the potential of this development strategy to revitalize the 
Canadian north and establish a foundation for future economic growth was abandoned and 
unrealized. According to Kyba, Hamilton was a member of a group of political intellectuals 
within Diefenbaker’s administration who were determined the set the country on a new 
course of political and economic development. “They were motivated by Canadian 
nationalism,” Kyba wrote, “a commitment to social justice, and a conviction that government 
must create the conditions whereby private enterprise could develop the nation.”25
  Morris Zaslow’s The Northward Expansion of Canada, 1914-1967, published in 
1988, was the first scholarly study to assess federal designs for the North and for postwar 
regional economic development.26 The ‘Northern Vision’ was not a focus of Zaslow’s study, 
15
24 Patrick J. Kyba, Alvin: A Biography of the Honourable Alvin Hamilton, P.C., (Regina: Canadian Plains 
Research Centre, 1989): 94.
25 Ibid., 147.
26 Morris Zaslow, The Northward Expansion of Canada, 1914-67, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1988): 
332. Zaslow explained that the ‘Northern Vision’ was a “concept of developing the North as a national duty” 
which “embraced the provincial as well as territorial norths” and had the political merit of appeal to every 
regional, sectarian, or class interest. Zaslow’s historical survey of Canadian north remains a benchmark in 
Northern Canadian historiography and an important precursor to this study.
which examined how resource development and the construction of road infrastructure were 
growing imperatives for the Canadian government by the 1950s.  Even so, the ‘Northern 
Vision’ had various positive consequences for the territories, Zaslow argued, some of which 
were not as incongruent with the interest of northern residents as previous studies had 
assumed. For instance, the ‘Roads to Resources’ program established a series of access roads 
and infrastructure that alleviated the feeling of isolation that northerners felt and improved 
the position of resource industries.27 To offset Canada’s economic recession, the Diefenbaker 
government invested heavily to open up the energy and natural resource potential of the 
Canadian north. This also brought a high-degree of government activity and 
interdepartmental cooperation into the region, which until that period had yielded to the de 
facto strategic plans of the American military.
 More recent writings in Canadian and northern Canadian historiography offer partial 
examinations that confirm the approaches of past scholarship on this topic. Several studies 
that discuss the impact of federal policy and economic development strategy for the North 
are not directly concerned with the regional implications of the ‘Northern Vision’ in 
particular. Frances Abele’s 1987 article “Canadian Contradictions: Forty Years of Northern 
Political Development” emphasized that the federal government’s episodic and irregular 
attention to northern development results from “contradictions in Canadian conceptions of 
the role of the state and the nature of democracy and to the persistence of the ‘National 
Policy’ economic development strategy.”28 Abele’s argues that intermittent development has 
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produced a fundamental complication where “the foundations of northern constitutional 
practice have not solidified, nor has the economy of the North fully taken shape.”29
The extensive scholarship by Ken S. Coates and William R. Morrison has 
significantly advanced the history of Northern Canada. In their 2005 survey history of the 
Yukon Territory, Land of the Midnight Sun, they noted that the construction of roads and 
highways, as well as the proliferation mining activity during the late 1950s and 1960s, were 
direct products of Diefenbaker’s ‘Northern Vision.’ The federal government's investment in 
the mining sector and redevelopment plans for the Yukon’s Dawson City were obvious signs 
of Diefenbaker's commitment to developing the Canadian north.30 Furthermore, their 1994 
article “The Federal Government and Urban Development in Northern Canada after World 
War II” examined the federal government's administration and designs for redeveloping 
Whitehorse and Dawson City. In this article, they demonstrated that northerners’ local issues 
and grievances were subjugated by federal designs for northern municipal expansion, which 
were inconsistent with the thoughts and opinions of local residents.31 Both studies suggest 
that, following the Second World War, the Canadian government had a strong interest in 
intervening and managing the regional economic development of the North and committed to 
various initiatives that would establish a foothold for future socioeconomic development.
 After half a century of scholarly debate, historians have yet to determine whether the 
‘Northern Vision’ was critical to Diefenbaker’s political success and/or failure. Past 
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scholarship has confirmed that the ‘Northern Vision’ was both politically and personally 
important to Diefenbaker and, despite its bold ideas for national and northern development, 
his ‘Vision’ suffered from maladministration and various political and economic obstacles. It 
was a benchmark in the postwar development of the Canadian north, and expanded both the 
boundaries (and limitations) of federal and territorial administration at its time. Past 
scholarship has neglected examining the actual development and articulation of this policy, 
and has emphasized its shortcomings and failures to an extent that unfairly undermines the 
political legitimacy of Diefenbaker’s ‘Vision’.
18
Chapter One
The ‘Northern Vision’ in the House of Commons and the formulation of the 
‘National Development Policy’
Apparently we have administered these vast territories of the north in an 
almost continuing state of absence of mind. I think all honourable 
members now feel that the territories are vastly important to Canada and 
that it is time that more attention was focused upon their possibilities 
and what they will mean to this nation. We in the southern part of 
Canada have been so busy in recent years that we have given little close 
attention to the north country. In the thirties we were concerned with 
economic problems; then during the war years there was little that we 
could devote ourselves to but to the tasks of war. Since the war, the 
growth and development in every province and the problems of the cold 
war have absorbed practically the whole of our attention.32 
Rt. Hon. St. Laurent, Ottawa, 8 December 1953
 In 1953, administration of the Canadian north became the responsibility of a 
newly-established federal department: the Department of Northern Affairs and 
National Resources (DNANR). The government combined the Northern 
Administration and Lands Branch with the Department of Mines and Resources into a 
single office to better seize the natural resource wealth embedded in Canada’s vast 
Precambrian shield. DNANR received a sharp increase in federal financial support, 
specifically to extend transportation, facilitate northern resource development, and 
complement the economic growth occurring nationwide. 
DNANR contended with its first major issue when the construction of the 
Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line required careful supervision of American 
contractors building an extensive radar network in the Far North from 1955-57. 
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Accordingly, continental defence priorities impeded the advance of northern resource 
development through the 1950s.33 Several prominent Ottawa bureaucrats were 
concerned with Washington’s designs for the North. According to historian Shelagh D. 
Grant, “Northern nationalists” were convinced that the future of Canada was the 
responsible development of the North and any subordination to the United States 
would result in a loss of economic and political autonomy.34 As early as 1943, 
Malcolm MacDonald, the British High Commissioner of Canada, had recognized the 
potential risk of unmonitored American activity in the Arctic: 
It  is surely unfortunate that  the Canadian authorities have little real say as to, for 
example, the exact  placing of these airfields, and the exact route of these roads on 
Canadian soil. The Americans decide these according to what  they consider 
American interests. Responsible American officers will tell you frankly in 
confidence that...they are designing those works also to be of particular value for (a) 
commercial aviation and transport  after the war and (b) waging war against the 
Russians in the next world crisis.35
While de jure sovereignty concerns over the Canada’s northern territories were secured by 
early postwar agreement,36 the Canadian government sought to recover de facto control and 
territorial jurisdiction over its internal dominion by the late 1950s. As historian William R. 
Morrison noted, “It was not that the American government had conscious designs on 
Canadian sovereignty; rather, they had a clear idea of what they wanted and needed in the 
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Canadian north, and saw no reason why what was in their interests should not be in the 
interests of the Canadians as well.”37 After all, American investments in military 
infrastructure improved transportation and communications in the Canadian north. After the 
establishment of DNANR in 1953 and the construction of the DEW Line, however, the 
Canadian government was managing two imperatives in the North: monitoring the northern 
flanks of continental security and exploiting natural resources that remained inaccessible to 
the Canadian government and private enterprise.
 From 1957 to 58, Diefenbaker and a small group of close associates developed an 
innovative economic strategy that centered upon the development of the Canadian north. 
Many Canadians who had concerns for the North - particularly, its increasing militarization 
during the Cold War - were captivated by Diefenbaker’s ‘Northern Vision,’ an innovative 
approach that recast the region as a rich source of resources that would resuscitate the 
Canadian economy from recession. Diefenbaker won nationwide support during the 1958 
election, and soon afterwards announced that the ‘National Development Policy’ would work 
to advance the exploitation of northern resources. This chapter examines the planning of the 
Progressive Conservative’s ‘National Development Policy,’ the formal title for Diefenbaker’s 
‘Northern Vision,’ and Diefenbaker’s adoption of it as a political platform for the 1958 
federal election.
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The Liberal Era: The North during the early to mid-1950s 
 By the mid-1950s, public and private interest in the development of Canada’s natural 
resources became a significant item of parliamentary debate. Canada reached its highest level 
of economic postwar growth between 1954 and 1956, a product of high capital investment in 
natural resources as well as large projects such as the St. Lawrence Seaway and the Trans-
Canada Pipeline. Private investments increased from 13% in 1955 to 25% in 1956; a 
response to the Government’s broad and general incentives to the private sector.38 Walter 
Lockhart Gordon, a member of Toronto accounting firm Clarkson, Gordon & Company, and 
a close financial consultant to the Liberal Cabinet, was concerned with the degree of foreign 
capital invested in the Canadian economy and the growing takeover of Canadian industries 
by American businesses. In 1955, Gordon was appointed as the chair of the Royal 
Commission on Canada’s Economic Prospects, intended as a comprehensive and impartial 
survey of the existing state of the Canadian economy, and a reasoned and cautious forecast of 
its probable future.39 The Gordon Commission revealed that from 1945 to 1957 the amount 
of foreign capital investments grew from $7 billion to $17.4 billion. Concerns over foreign 
and particularly American ownership and control of Canadian industry prompted nationalist 
bureaucrats to reevaluate the political and economic direction of the country. Furthermore, 
this raised questions about the leadership of Prime Minister St. Laurent and Minister of 
Finance C.D. Howe and the complacency of Liberal administration after twenty-two years. 
According to Conservative nationalist historian Donald G. Crieghton, the political, economic 
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and cultural independence of Canada had been suspended to accommodate the prerogatives 
of key Liberal members. In The Forked Road, Creighton argued that: 
Howe’s main aims were still the continuation of his own dictatorial economic powers 
and the invention of new and still more imposing schemes of economic development. 
St. Laurent was concentrating more and more exclusively on the problems of federal-
provincial relations, which together with the issue of imperial relationship, had been 
his main preoccupation in his early years as Prime Minister.40
In this climate of political mistrust for the Liberal administration, the Progressive 
Conservative Party, led by John G. Diefenbaker, began to gain favor with the general public. 
  An obstacle to Diefenbaker's ‘National Development Policy’ was the government’s 
difficulty establishing a federal presence in the sub-Arctic and Arctic regions. The economic 
recession of the late 1950s coupled with an emerging global imperative for natural resources 
prompted a renewed interest in the Canadian government to find new ways of accessing the 
sub-Arctic. Despite Diefenbaker’s criticism that the Liberals had done very little to further 
economic development in the North, St. Laurent established a federal office that managed the 
increasing mining activity occurring in the North when the DNANR was formed in 1953.41 
The streamlined responsibilities of this single northern agency was logical to Canadian 
politicians, but complicated the jurisdictional boundaries of municipal, territorial and federal 
administration in the North. Moreover, this allowed the federal government to intervene in 
the political processes of the northern territories and to supervise regional economic 
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development.42 In reality, this was not an efficient or negotiable form of territorial 
administration, but allowed the federal government to implement a systematic strategy for 
northern reform.
 Diefenbaker understood the cultural importance that Canadians ascribed to the North 
and its vast natural resources. He was also intensely nationalistic and astute enough to realize 
that lobbying for resolute direction of the national economy and development of northern 
natural resources might provide him with the leverage to defeat the Liberal government in 
1957. Before he was elected leader of the Opposition in 1957, Diefenbaker prepared an 
address for the House of Commons which displayed his famed nationalistic fervor and 
contempt for Liberal administration. He stated:
I myself year after year have been urging a Bill of Rights to preserve the fundamental 
freedoms of British Canadianism from the overruling of power of Government 
autocratic authority. On March 5th my colleague Mr. Dinsdale from Brandon Souris 
proposed a Resolution which came up for debate in the House of Commons and 
which was stated in these terms...The government should consider the advisability of 
taking advantage of every possible opportunity to promote the decentralization of 
industry...thereby, helping to reverse the trend towards concentration of population in 
large metropolitan areas with the accompanying social evils; encouraging a more 
equitable distribution of population and development right  across Canada...Do not 
think that I am discouraged. No parliaments in the history of constitutional 
government was more vigorous in its discussions and in its debates than is this 22nd 
Parliament  of the Dominion of Canada. The trouble is we have a government  too long 
entrenched in power. A government with a complacent majority that  cares nothing 
except  remaining in office. What is needed is to restore the balance between 
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parliamentary groups and the only way this can be done is to change the executive 
which means electing a majority of Progressive Conservative members of Parliament 
to sit in the 23rd Parliament which is to follow.43 
Diefenbaker had an obvious concern for the growing regionalism across Canada and 
concentration of power within the federal government. He was determined to find a means to 
mitigate the regional disparities in income and welfare, and believed that a transcending 
national policy could shake Parliament from what he saw as the the complacent drift of its 
Liberal administration. 
In 1956, Diefenbaker's comments foreshadowed the oratory of his ‘Northern Vision.’ 
His political interest for the Canadian north stemmed from his beliefs in social justice and 
national development. In his memoirs, Diefenbaker related:
To me, government not  only had to be of and by the people, but most positively for 
the people. Unless government  concerned itself with the problems of the individual 
working man and farmer, unless government  was cognizant  of the problems of the 
small businessman and not  just the corporate giants, unless government  acted in the 
interests of our senior citizens, our veterans, our blind and disabled, unless 
government sought a basic equality of citizenship, of opportunity, and of well-being 
for all our peoples, then government  had lost  sight  of its true purpose. I argued that 
the Liberals had long since forgotten the fact  that human betterment  is the essence of 
government. 44
Partisanship aside, he placed the “New Frontier” at the core of his pan-Canadian national 
vision:
I regarded a Canadian Bill of Rights as fundamental to my philosophy of social 
justice and national development. My focus was on the individual betterment of 
Canadians. If historic freedoms were not protected, then my programs to ensure a 
climate of expansion and development from Atlantic to Pacific, then my concern that 
all Canadians should enjoy a reasonable share of the good life, then my vision of the 
“New Frontier”, would be for naught.”One Canada” stood for prejudice towards none 
and freedom at all.45
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Diefenbaker’s concept of social justice expanded after he was introduced to the economic 
theories of Dr. Merril Menzies and Alvin Hamilton. In November 1956, months prior to 
Conservative leadership convention, Diefenbaker’s Prince Albert friend Dr. Glenn Green 
introduced him to his brother-in-law Merril Menzies, an economist completing his doctoral 
thesis on Canadian wheat policy. Menzies had innovative thoughts on the Conservative’s 
national economic policy. In a letter to Diefenbaker, Menzies wrote: “I have been acutely 
conscious of the emphasis you have been putting on the need to formulate a national 
development policy...The fact that you as a politician have discerned the necessity of such a 
policy is greatly encouraging to me after many years of frustration.”46 Diefenbaker 
encouraged Menzies to expand on his ideas and suggested he take inspiration from 
Macdonald’s ‘National Policy.’ This resonated with Diefenbaker’s own Tory principles and 
admiration for Canada’s first prime minister.47
 To revive the Canadian economy from recession, Menzies believed that the Canadian 
market had to be transformed to stimulate economic and resource development, and to ensure 
reasonable standards of economic stability and employment.48 According to Patrick J. Kyba, 
Menzies’ theories of a national economic policy emphasized that “if Canada were to maintain 
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her national identity the federal government had to abandon the doctrine of laissez fair.”49 In 
1957, Menzies wrote:
What  is lacking is a national policy and the realization that  without  one we must 
invariably drift into economic continentalism in which we can have little economic 
independence or effective sovereignty. The regional north south pull of the American 
industrial colossus is such that only by the most determined and ceaseless efforts can 
we hope to maintain our integrated national economy. Only by great  thought and 
effort can we prevent  the unconscious betrayal of the national heritage bequeathed to 
use by Sir John A. Macdonald.50 
Menzies suggested that the government build a larger industrial economic sector which 
would permit more resources to be processed and manufactured in Canada. By encouraging 
projects that would open remote regions with natural resource wealth, the Canadian economy 
could expand its energy resources, better exploit non-renewable resources in a more efficient 
and profitable manner, and increase the domestic processing of oil, ore and mineral 
resources. Menzies had devised an innovative economic development strategy that, 
ultimately, served as the basis for Diefenbaker’s ‘Northern Vision.’ Furthermore, Menzies 
deemed it important that Canadians financially participate in the development and expansion 
of their own economy, in the interests of social justice and equality.51 Diefenbaker eventually 
recruited Menzies as a policy aid in the Progressive Conservative party office, where he 
helped develop the party’s political platform for the upcoming election campaign.52 
 Several months before the 1957 federal election, the Liberal MP for the Yukon 
Territory, James Aubrey Simmons, addressed Parliament and argued for the construction of 
more Northern roads and highways. In January 1957, the Liberals legislated a road 
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construction policy for the Yukon, which required the territorial government to pay 15% of 
all maintenance costs for newly-constructed roads. As one of the few federal representatives 
for the Canadian Arctic, Simmons felt that the cost-sharing arrangement of this road 
development policy was unjustifiable because of the Yukon’s large area and sparse 
population. The Liberal government acknowledged that the expansion of physical 
infrastructure and roads would have long-term economic benefit for the North (and Canada 
as a whole), but Simmons was more concerned with public interest and the welfare of 
northerners. Permanents residents were not the intended beneficiaries of road development 
projects, and because the government had often strategically or economically determined 
where new roads would be built, Simmons argued that the federal government should 
“provide all capital expenditures required to maintain and advance our economic position in 
the north.” He emphasized that exploratory work and northern development depended on 
improved roads, railways, and transportation facilities. Moreover, Simmons was aware that 
past infighting and competition between the parties had stymied progress in opening the 
Canadian north.53 With the general election approaching, Simmons hoped for a new federal 
government with the vision to realize the potential of northern development.
The ‘National Development Policy’ in the Federal Setting: Policy Formulation and 
Philosophy
 On 12 February 1957, Conservative leader John G. Diefenbaker presented a speech 
that promoted the national - and global - importance of Canada’s natural resources. Although 
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his national economic policy was more concerned with provincial agriculture economies, it 
foreshadowed his ‘Northern Vision.’ Like Simmons, Diefenbaker appreciated the value of 
Canada’s natural resources in the postwar global economy. He also warned Canadians of 
competing geopolitical interest to develop and control access of Canada’s natural resource 
wealth:
Everywhere today the search is for the raw materials necessary for defence. One of 
the major reason’s for Nasser’s action in the Suez and also the degree to which he is 
undermining Britain and France in the Middle East is the supplies of oil which as 
Nasser has set  forth in his book are necessary if the instruments of technology are to 
be mobilized effectively.54
Months prior to the 1957 election, Diefenbaker assured members of Parliament that a 
Progressive Conservative government would legislate a national policy of development that 
would stimulate economic growth nationwide, especially in regions impeded by 
inaccessibility and underdevelopment. This national policy was an economic strategy that 
would remedy the “inexorably drift into economic continentalism” and the unmonitored 
growth of American commercial influence on Canadian industry.55 Canada’s natural 
resources were globally significant and, at the same time, intrinsic to Canada’s identity as a 
northern nation. Promoting the exploitation of natural resources could maintain Canada’s 
economic sovereignty from the United States, reinforce national sovereignty, and more 
importantly, serve Diefenbaker’s political ambitions and bid to become Prime Minister of 
Canada.
 Diefenbaker’s economic strategy was simple: using the fiscal benefits accrued from 
commercial development of northern natural resources, he could offset the massive federal 
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expenditures that his government was prepared to invest in the North. Concessions to aid 
northern social welfare issues would be provided thereafter. Diefenbaker stated that: 
There is no question of constitutional division of responsibility between the dominion 
and the provinces in the North West Territories. In that  area there are vast  resources 
that should be developed, with the state making possible that  development  by 
providing the means and the climate for private industry to develop and expand.56 
This approach to northern development did differ substantively from the Liberals’ economic 
development strategy. The Conservatives, however, planned to cooperate with private 
industry to stimulate economic activity in the North instead of relying on the American 
military.
 Diefenbaker’s vision for the Canadian north continued a tradition of resource 
development that began with Sir John A. Macdonald. Nearly every Conservative leader since 
Confederation had pledged their government to policies of utilizing natural resources, 
protectionism, and national development. In Diefenbaker’s case, his mandate to pursue a new 
course of national development with a north and south dimension, perpetuated a 
Conservative vision held since their purchase of Rupert’s Land and North-West Territory in 
1868.57 In the House of Commons, Diefenbaker stated:
I can see this northland of ours with developments envisaged by D’Arcy McGee in 
his magnificent speech at  the time of confederation as he saw that  great Canada. I can 
see cities in northern Canada north of the Arctic circle. There are vast power 
potentialities in that  area. I can see cities developing as they are developing today in 
Norway, if only the government would catch the vision of possibilities. I am one of 
those who believe in the vision of Sir Wilfred Laurier and of Sir Robert  Borden in 
1912; I am one of those who believe that there should be undertaken in cooperation 
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between the federal government and the provinces, a national highway policy, to 
provide highways for vast developments in the north.58 
The North was a symbol of Canada’s underdevelopment and a promise to fulfill a national 
destiny. 
The first outline of Diefenbaker’s ‘National Development Policy’ can be traced back 
to the Progressive Conservative party’s leadership convention in December 1956. The 
convention elected Diefenbaker as the next leader and passed a series of resolutions written 
by Alvin G. Hamilton, the leader of the Saskatchewan’s provincial party. These new party 
objectives, entitled the “Declaration of Principles by the Progressive Conservative National 
Convention,” were based on three fundamental principles: resource development, social 
equality, and government intervention. For Hamilton, Canada’s development of natural 
resources was a means to assure social equality for all Canadians. In Hamilton’s words, the 
declaration read:
We must embark on a national development policy that  will strengthen Canada by 
strengthening all areas and groups and regions (which) must have equal opportunities 
to share in the National prosperity…(it  will) develop natural resources for the 
maximum benefit of all parts of Canada; encourage more processing of these 
resources in Canada; foster the widest  financial and other participation by Canadians 
in the development of our resources; promote greater opportunity and employment 
for a steadily increasing population...In order that a National Development Policy and 
a strong political state may bring equitable and increased advantage to all there must 
be a program of human betterment. This program will be a comprehensive 
contributory system that covers the aged, the unemployed, the sick, and the injured. It 
must be such a system that preserves the individual, the home, the volunteer group, 
the Provincial and Municipal powers. There must  be incentive to encourage the 
individual to be a proud, participating member in a self-reliant  society. When 
contributions cannot be made and where need exists our principles will guarantee 
assistance of the state.59
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Even though the general objectives of the ‘National Development Policy’ were established, 
the formal strategy and specific programs were not outlined conclusively until after 
Diefenbaker’s re-election in 1958, nearly a year later. Natural resource development and 
regional socioeconomic equality were two imperatives of the ‘National Development Policy’ 
that remained prominent features through the entire course of its development. 
 In early 1957, Diefenbaker called together politicians, advisors and consultants to 
decide on the Progressive Conservative’s upcoming election platform and work on the ideas 
developed during the leadership convention. Along with Hamilton and Menzies, Diefenbaker 
invited Donald Eldon, head of the Progressive Conservative party’s research staff, Don 
Johnston, an economic aid and lawyer, and Roy Faibish, the prime minister’s chief political 
advisor.60 They developed a fourteen-page document, entitled “The Progressive Conservative 
National Development Policy.” This policy endorsed a strategy of regional resource 
development that would equally distribute wealth and earnings nationwide. This proposal 
was an expansive economic policy for both the provinces and northern territories. It 
reaffirmed the spirit of equality that Diefenbaker had advocated in his ‘Canada First’ policy 
and aligned him with Macdonald’s legacy of nation-building. The programs and policies 
outlined in the ‘National Development Policy’ included: a national energy policy, a national 
resource inventory, a national farm development policy, increased markets for both farm and 
industrial products, greater domestic processing of Canadian resources, greater investment by 
Canadians in domestic industries, a policy to protect and promote small business, an 
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immigration policy to enlarge the domestic markets, and most importantly, a strategy to 
advance northern development.61 
 This was the first discernible inclusion of the Canadian north in the Progressive 
Conservative’s upcoming political platform. The ‘National Development Policy’ stated that 
“the Federal government should become aware of the vast potential of our northland frontier, 
and should take steps to broaden this country from north to south, as the Conservative 
government of Sir John A. Macdonald broadened it from east to west.”62 Although unclear 
about who specifically advocated the North as an economic imperative of the ‘National 
Development Policy,’ this proved to be the most crucial component of the political platform 
when Diefenbaker announced his ‘Northern Vision’ at the inauguration of the Conservative’s 
1958 election campaign.
 For the Liberals, a contentious issue flowing from the ‘National Development Policy’ 
concerned the right of the provinces to ownership of their natural resources. The transfer of 
Rupert’s Land and North-Western territory in 1870 had granted the federal government the 
exclusive right to manage all affairs relating to the use and development of the Yukon and 
Northwest Territories’ natural resources. Under Liberal administrations from 1935 until 1957, 
however, it was generally understood that the issues surrounding natural resources and 
resource development were “regional problems or local problems and must be handled on a 
regional or local basis.”63 The primary issue of dispute was the agreement included in the 
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Constitution Act of 1867. At the time of Canada’s Confederation, the British North America 
Act granted the provinces the rights of ownership to their natural resources. It specified:
In each province, the legislature may exclusively make laws in relation to: 
exploration for non-renewable natural resources in the province; development, 
conservation and management  of non-renewable natural resources and forestry 
resources in the province, including laws in relation to the rate of primary production 
therefrom; and development, conservation and management of sites and facilities in 
the province for the generation and production of electric energy.64
On this basis, Liberal Minister of NANR, Jean Lesage criticized Diefenbaker’s economic 
strategy:
It  is certainly not  clear how this parliament or this government can establish a policy, 
a master plan, in domain of resources without infringing on provincial rights...British 
North American Act  places resources under the control of the provinces is not  a 
matter of accident or coincidence...it is rather a reflection by the fathers of 
confederation of the basic fact of our national existence.65 
The next step was for Diefenbaker to negotiate separate contracts with each province, which 
would allow the federal government to exploit provincially owned natural resources and 
build development roads and highways that would promote mining activity in the sub-Arctic. 
The early obstacles to the implementation of the ‘National Development Policy’ was not 
public support but gaining the support of the provincial governments and fostering a sense of 
unity amongst each level of government - to share in his vision of national development. 
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The ‘National Development Policy’ in the Federal Setting: The 1957 and 1958 Federal 
Elections
 Diefenbaker presented the ‘National Development Policy’ to the public during the 
1957 election campaign, after nearly a year of devising his strategy. It was similar to the 
outline that Diefenbaker presented to House of Commons months earlier, and asserted the 
same nationalistic and philosophical tone that Diefenbaker, Hamilton, and Menzies had 
envisioned. During the campaign season, the Progressive Conservative party published a 
pamphlet entitled “A New National Policy” which outlined their party’s policy platform, 
programs, national concerns, and excerpts of Diefenbaker’s speeches. It was also the first 
published explanation of the ‘National Development Policy’ available to the public. The 
pamphlet emphasized five major economic initiatives:
Natural Resource Policy
1. Every encouragement must be given to the processing of domestic raw materials in 
Canada to a much greater degree than exists today; 
2. Foreign investment must not be discouraged, but it must be directed to the 
maximum benefit of Canada.
3. Canadian subsidiaries of foreign concerns...should be required to provide a 
substantial interest in their equity stock to Canadians investors.
4….wherever possible foreign companies should employ Canadian in senior 
management and technical posts.
National Energy Board
To meet the industrial demands of Canada’s future I believe that there is need now for 
the setting up of a Canadian Energy Board...to the end that the most effective use of 
the energy resources of Canada in the interests of the public welfare may be assured. 
Roads to Resources
I believe that a National Highway policy should be launched to provide highways for 
peace and development wherein the Federal Government will make contributions to 
or share in cooperation with the provinces. The challenge of Communism now and in 
the years ahead demands that our vast northern resources be made accessible and 
available to industry, for vast resources undeveloped and hidden in the earth will not 
fashion or forge the shield of freedom or contribute to the survival of the Free World. 
Tax Structure to be Revised
I believe that the entire tax structure in Canada needs to be overhauled with a view to 
providing encouragement to the promotion of primary and secondary industries in our 
country. 
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A Fair Share for Farmers
We will assure the farmer of his fair share of the national income by maintaining a 
flexible price-support programme to ensure an adequate parity for agricultural 
producers based on a fair price-cost relationship….Agriculture and its welfare is a 
basic cornerstone of (our) policy.66
 Diefenbaker believed that Canada’s national development could be advanced through 
regional resource development, careful direction of the national resource economy, and 
promotion of economic equality throughout Canada. The general objectives and main 
components of the ‘National Development Policy’ were apparent. With this proposal for 
regional resource development, Diefenbaker laid out a clear strategy to carry out northern 
development. Nonetheless, he had not yet discerned the political opportunism in promoting 
northern development. 
 In 1958, the Liberal opposition pressed the Conservatives to proceed with the 
‘National Development Policy.’  Jean Lesage told the House of Commons that the “policy 
was not defined in the speech from the throne.... I have not been able to find a definition of 
the National Development Policy or plan. The only logical conclusions to which we can 
come is that this government has no national development plan or policy in mind.”67  In 
response, the Conservatives accused the Liberals of twenty-two years of complacency 
regarding the North. Indeed, Diefenbaker wanted to preserve the ‘National Development 
Policy’ until the next campaign, when he touted it as a way to rescue Parliament from the 
lassitude of previous administrations. The ‘National Development Policy’ affirmed:
Parliament  has been treated with shocking contempt, sorely wounded and robbed of 
its rights. It  has lost  its independence and its power has been usurped by a few 
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ministers who treated the rest of the Cabinet  as juniors and members of all Parties as 
though they were not entitled to be in the House at all...The concentration of 
overwhelming power in the hands of the Cabinet  has disciplined its majority into 
abject servility.68
To garner additional popular support, the Conservatives needed to restore the legislative 
integrity of the Canadian Parliament before the next election which, only days after the 1957 
results were in, seemed to lay on the short-term horizon.69
 During the short parliamentary session between 1957-58, Diefenbaker appointed 
Douglas Harkness, the representative for Calgary North, Alberta as the interim Minister of 
DNANR. Harkness was responsible for two portfolios which were indispensable to 
Diefenbaker’s economic plans: the Department of Agriculture and DNANR. Even though 
Hamilton had an intimate knowledge of the ‘National Development Policy’ and had 
convinced Diefenbaker to pursue development in the Canadian north, he was hesitant about 
becoming a Cabinet minister and declined early recommendations.70 Diefenbaker felt that 
Hamilton would be able to better implement and defend his national economic policies as a 
senior member of his Cabinet.71 In August 1957, Hamilton was formerly appointed the 
Minster of NANR, and his first order of business was to restructure the department’s staff 
and prepare for the forthcoming election. 
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 Following the 1958 election, the Conservative government’s first priority was to 
improve northern transportation and encourage the processing of domestic natural resources. 
The first major announcement of the ‘Roads to Resources’ program was made on 26 March 
1958, when press releases shared some general details about the projects currently underway 
and listed DNANR’s northern development objectives. “Work has begun on projects in the 
Yukon and Northwest Territories involving over 1,200 miles of roads and six major bridges 
at an estimated cost of over $31 million,” Hamilton announced.72 The ‘Roads to Resources’ 
program was part of the ‘Northern Roads Programme,’ a transnational and federally assisted 
road construction initiative with wide implications for the North’s economy and its 
development. The ‘Northern Roads Programmes’ consisted of two large-scale development 
projects: the ‘Roads to Resources’ program and the ‘Territorial Roads program.’73 
 Diefenbaker’s brain trust considered the North’s insufficient transportation system as 
the premier reason for its arrested economic development. Their underlying assumption was 
that if the federal government could build a main access route that drove through the North, 
this would encourage commercial industries to expand and build up peripheral areas. 
Diefenbaker envisaged that in time this would create interconnected settlements and 
stimulate economic and commercial developments throughout the North. In the House of 
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Commons, however, Liberal leader Lester B. Pearson ridiculed the programs for constructing 
roads from ‘igloo to igloo’.74
 Diefenbaker believed the exploitation of natural resources and the general 
development of the North depended on the success of the ‘Roads to Resources’ program. 
This method of developing transportation infrastructure to access frontier regions occurred 
simultaneously elsewhere in the world, and was often an important precondition to 
substantiate a government’s ownership over an indigenous territory. According to Ken 
Coates: 
Governments in both the capitalist and communist worlds, as well as in satellite or 
colonial states, recognized the growing material expectations of their dominant 
societies. Demand held in check during the war years burst into the open at war’s 
end. Private developers moved quickly to meet  the seemingly insatiable desire for 
consumables, requiring in the process access to new and cheaper resources. Put 
simply, the world needed more resources and the once remote regions of the world 
seemed to offer an enormous storehouse of untapped wealth...Huge development 
projects - hydroelectric dams and transmission lines, oil and natural gas fields, base 
metal mines, large sawmills and pulp-and-paper operations - sprang up throughout 
the 1950s and 1960s throughout  isolated regions in Australia, Scandinavia, Southeast 
Asia, Canada, Russia, and Brazil.75
Coates designated this era of global resource development as a significant chapter in postwar 
native-newcomer relations. The consequences of this rapid course of postwar development 
continue to have an effect on government relations with indigenous people. As a result of this 
postwar imperative for natural resources, frontier regions such as the Canadian north were no 
longer defined by their isolation and distance from developed regions.
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 Internal government documents confirm that the ‘Roads to Resources’ program was 
the principal pillar of Diefenbaker’s ‘National Development Policy.’76 Hamilton asserted that 
transportation remained the most important service that the government could provide for the 
North - expectations were that roads would open the North to new geological surveys, 
mining activity and commercial prospects. The Diefenbaker government understood that 
because of vast distances between Northern settlements, road expenditures were going to be 
high. Federal assistance was necessary to build roads, highways and airfields, as well as 
partially in the case of railways. Hamilton admitted that the premier issue in recent years was 
the problem of timing: “Should the facilities be put into promising areas ahead of 
development, or should they follow? And if they go in ahead, how much ahead should they 
go, and how much should governments be prepared to spend on the job?”77  Under its “new 
territorial development road program,” the federal government expected to invest a minimum 
of $100 million over the next six or seven years. Given the high expenditures attached to it, 
bureaucrats saw the cautious and reticent approach of DNANR to northern development as 
sensible. Hamilton, however, felt that bureaucratic timing was the foremost complication to 
the ‘Roads to Resources’ program.78 This was incorrect.
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  The exclusive right of the provinces to develop provincial resources, as described in 
the British North America Act, was a serious problem for the ‘Roads to Resources’ program. 
This bureaucratic issue could have potentially undermined entire basis of the ‘National 
Development Program,’ preventing the government from enacting a nationwide strategy of 
resource development. From 1958-59, formal negotiations were underway between each 
province and the federal government to allow DNANR to build access roads and highways 
into northern Canada. Moreover, it was important that these northern provincial roads were 
integrated with the existing provincial highway network to create a new national highway 
system that covered the entire country.79 This immense construction project, however, had 
many unintended consequences for northern Aboriginal settlements in the North. It appeared 
that the Canadian government did not incorporate human values or give consideration for 
nearby indigenous peoples in their construction plans or overall philosophy. 
  The Diefenbaker government promised the provincial governments a share in the 
revenue accrued from northern resource development and encouraged a degree of integration 
between the provincial and territorial economies.80 Moreover, these negotiations were used in 
part to determine potential areas for resource development and how private enterprise might 
facilitate this process.81 The federal government offered to assist the provinces with one-half 
of the construction costs; an estimated $75 million in federal funds. The cost-sharing 
arrangement between the federal, provincial and territorial governments stipulated three 
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different categories of roads. First, in the case of major development roads or highways, the 
federal government would supervise and finance construction until the project’s completion. 
Afterwards, upkeep and maintenance costs were divided 85 per cent for the federal 
government and 15 per cent for the territorial and provincial governments. Second, the 
construction and maintenance of access roads - routes that extended from major roads to 
potential resource areas - were the responsibility of private industry or businesses with the 
possibility of federal financial support if the specified area was of economic value. The 
government would immediately encourage any form of resource development that occurred 
outside of its purview. Lastly, the territorial governments were directly responsible for the 
construction and maintenance of local territorial roads, which were intended to serve the 
needs of permanent residents and therefore did not conform with the government’s ‘National 
Development Policy.’82 The ‘Roads to Resources’ program only required the federal 
government to finance the physical construction of roads and highways; federal 
responsibility for maintenance costs was determined on a case by case basis.83 
 A year after the Conservatives announced the ‘Roads to Resources’ program, nine of 
ten provinces had responded to the federal government’s offer. In a DNANR memorandum, 
Hamilton announced that the Western provinces and Ontario agreed to support the federal 
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government’s plans and would build roads that would reach the North. These regions would 
benefit from mineral resource operations in the territorial and provincial norths. 84 
 Another transportation feature of the ‘National Development Policy,’ was the 
‘National Highway Act.’ The program was not associated with the ‘Roads to Resources’ 
program, but had proposed a second Trans-Canada Highway along a north-south axis, with 
additional feeder roads terminating at the southern border of the Yukon and Northwest 
territories. Hamilton declared that this second Trans-Canada Highway was of great national 
importance, although the project was later abandoned due to high cost projections, 
government infighting, and its similarity to the ‘Roads to Resources’ program.85
 In 1959, a tentative schedule for the next six to seven years - which was the subject of 
continuous review - pushed the projected expenditure upward from $31 million to an 
estimated $70 to $100 million.86 The limited road and highway systems of the Yukon and 
Northwest Territories - including the Mackenzie Highway, the Alaska Highway and the 
Whitehorse-Dawson Road - would serve as the framework for a new system of feeder roads 
to access sites of undeveloped natural resources.  This was peculiar, given that coordinated 
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surveying expeditions in the sub-Arctic had not found any economically significant deposit 
of minerals, oil and gas. The lead-zinc discovery at Pine Point and oil deposits at Eagle 
Plains had been known to the Canadian government for some time.87
 Nonetheless, Cyril T. Young, vice president of the Prospectors and Developers 
Association and a former superintendent of the Canadian National Railway’s Resources and 
Development Department, reminded the government of the social and commercial 
opportunities of the ‘Roads to Resources program. In an article, he claimed:
The building of houses and apartments had never created permanent  employment  and 
development  across Canada; long time development, really worthwhile, has always 
been our large resources development. We have been bringing in people from far 
away countries until employment  now becomes the big question of the day, and the 
roads to resources (sic) all across Northern Canada to open up the North is the great 
need of Canada, between the sections that have pulp and paper mills and mining as 
well as power developments, northward to a reasonable distance instead of up at  the 
Arctic Ocean...The opening of a railway to Pine Point  brings in the advisability of 
more mining roads North from Grand Prairie and roads South from Keno Hill. Then 
when we come to that  wonderful province of B.C., roads out from Hazelton and 
down South into the Kooteneys where the new power is being wisely mutually 
developed; then more roads north as branch roads into the Dawson Highway and off 
the Inside Channel. Roads to resources (sic) is certainly the way to build up Canada 
from coast to coast  and where could a million dollars be better expended - a quarter 
or more of it this year.88 
Young’s comments reveal that the ‘Roads to Resources’ program had attracted interest from 
both private enterprise and northerners - constituencies that would profit from a new road and 
highways system. Put simply, the federal government had to solicit the private sector for 
large investments in order to accomplish the long-term development of the North. In April 
1960, Hamilton reported that his department had issued 98 million acres in exploration 
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permits for the Yukon and Northwest Territories and a further 142 million acres for the Arctic 
Archipelago.89
 Railway developments were another overlooked dimension of the ‘Northern Roads 
program.’ These initiatives were not under the direct purview of the ‘Territorial Roads 
Program’ or ‘Roads to Resources’ program, but were considered vital to the expansion of 
northern transportation. With Canadian industry in mind, DNANR took careful appraisal 
when planning routes so that they would provide access to significantly large deposits of 
natural resources, as to keep transportation costs low. The construction of rail lines to access 
a significant resource deposit was reserved for areas where large-scale development projects, 
high production, and long-term exploitation were expected. The transportation of metallic-
mineral ores and concentrates via railway proved to be the cheapest method of shipping 
materials from the territories to processing plants located in southern Canada. For example, 
the construction of a railway to Pine Point, situated south of the Great Slave Lake in the 
Northwest Territories, was a high-profile project featured in Diefenbaker’s ‘Northern Vision’ 
and incorporated into the ‘National Development Policy’. Hamilton stated that this railway 
was expected to “bring down costs and improve development prospects in the entire 
Mackenzie District.”90  
 In its earliest period of planning, the ‘National Development Policy’ was an 
innovative economic policy designed to resuscitate the Canadian economy from recession. 
The focus of this policy was the Canadian north, the undeveloped hinterland where 
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Diefenbaker envisaged access roads and private industries exploiting the untapped natural 
resource wealth for the benefit of all Canadians. Diefenbaker set a high-expectation for 
Canada’s national development under a new Conservative government and pursued Sir John 
A. Macdonald’s vision of northwest expansion. The ‘National Development Policy’ was not 
only an attempt to stimulate economic activity in the North, but Diefenbaker’s expansive 
approach to remedy the legislative integrity of Canadian Parliament, establish a new unifying 
myth for Canadian nationalism, and revive the government from the complacent drift of 
twenty-two years of Liberal administrations. 
 It was not providence that the ‘National Development Policy’ was devised during a 
period of competing political and economic interest for the Canadian north. An emerging 
global imperative for natural resource had increased the profile of the Northern Canada, and 
prompted both commercial enterprise and the Canadian government to determine new ways 
of accessing areas of undeveloped resource potential. Moreover, the Gordon Commission had 
highlighted the valuable economic prospect that exploitation of the North’s oil, gas and 
mineral resources had for the Canadian economy. An unfortunate development for Canadian 
businesses was the significant rise in foreign capital investments and growing concerns of 
American takeover and ownership of Canadian industry. With the help of Merrill Menzies 
and Alvin Hamilton, Diefenbaker hoped that northern development would stimulate 
economic activity nationwide, expand the domestic processing of oil, ore and mineral 
resources, and encourage the financial participation of Canadians in the expansion of their 
own economy. The ‘National Development Policy’ fired up the imaginations of Canadians, 
however, encountered major complication and contestation within the federal arena even 
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before the ‘Northern Vision’ was public announced during Diefenbaker’s 1958 election 
campaign.
 Diefenbaker’s first political mistake was that he purported that the ‘National 
Development Policy’ would be fully-implemented and the ‘Roads to Resources’ program 
complete within five to seven years.91 Even though the construction of northern roads and 
highways was a joint federal and provincial operation92 and Hamilton’s supervision had 
expanded the authority of DNANR well into the Canadian north, the government had not yet 
fully evaluated the costs, conditions and factors of their immense northern development 
projects. Moreover, the government had not incorporated any considerations for native 
Canadians or the indigenous peoples of the Canadian north into the principles and philosophy  
of the ‘National Development Policy.’ The development of this national policy revealed the 
immediacy and capricious nature of northern development strategies in the federal setting. 
When the program expenditures of the ‘Vision’ escalated from $31 million to $100 million, it  
foreshadowed a major complication that Diefenbaker contended with in 1962. The need for 
planning, or in some cases the lack thereof, demonstrated that the decision-making process of 
the ‘National Development Policy’ was under continual review and a definitive outline of the 
policy was not achieved until construction actually began in the North. The future 
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complications and failures of the ‘Northern Vision’ were a result of government oversight, 
maladministration and capricious planning evident at the earliest stages of its development.
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Chapter Two
 The ‘Northern Vision’ in Canadian Periodicals and the National Consciousness
 
Diefenbaker’s commitment to nation-building and natural resource development 
sparked early speculation that his party would set the tone for northern development in 
Canadian politics, and tapped into the “Arctic revolution” that was beginning in the region.93 
The ‘National Development Policy’ was an indispensable component to Diefenbaker’s 
political plans. It was a guide for Canadians to seize the opportunities of the Canadian north 
and an advocation of economic protectionism. From 1957 to 1958, Diefenbaker toured the 
nation pitching his ‘Northern Vision’ and successfully renewed acclaim for Conservative 
nationalism. In the years following his spectacular 1958 electoral victory, Diefenbaker 
learned that the patience of the Canadian people was not infinite. From 1961 to 1963, the 
‘Northern Vision’ encountered a number of setback and failures of implementation that were 
closely related to the limited number of natural resource deposits available to extraction and 
development. ‘The Chief’ ruined his popular image with Canadians by investing large 
expenditures in northern development projects that failed to materialize.
This chapter surveys the reportage and public’s interpretation of Diefenbaker’s 
political principles and party platform using primary-source material, such as periodicals, 
electoral and campaign speeches, memoirs, and personal notes. It chronicles its evolution 
from a party philosophy devised by Diefenbaker, Menzies and Hamilton, to its 
announcement as the keystone of the Conservative party platform during the 1958 federal 
election. The ‘Vision’ was highly publicized and reported in the Canadian press, although 
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analysis reveals that the primary journalistic interest was not concerned with regional issues 
of the North. Publicity and national interest for this distant and isolated Canadian territory 
grew as a clear, definable policy of northern development emerged.
1957: Gaining Political Capital and the Emerging Issue of the North 
 In early 1957, the Liberal government was entering its twenty-second consecutive 
year in office. As the newly appointed leader of the Conservative party, Diefenbaker was 
determined to seek out a new sense of Canadian nationalism that would resonate with 
Canada and generate dissatisfaction with the Liberals. In the pre-election season of 1957, 
Diefenbaker left the leadership of the Opposition in Parliament to Howard Green and 
travelled across the country to consolidate his support. He was a charismatic orator, stirring 
enthusiasm amongst Canadians with promises of a more noble vision for the country’s future. 
Nonetheless, Diefenbaker understood that the Progressive Conservative party needed 
innovative reform to appeal to Canadians and sweep into office.94 With the help of Allister 
Grosart, a Toronto advertising executive, Diefenbaker discarded most of the Party’s 
traditional policies in the hopes of correctly interpreting the shifting political climate so that 
he could undermine the Liberal party’s longstanding political supremacy.
  At the beginning of Diefenbaker’s campaign in 1957, his position on the 
development of the Canadian north was firm but disconnected from his Party’s approach to 
revitalizing the Canadian economy or even his populist political principals. His ‘One 
Canada’ policy disapproved of Liberal taxation, renewed support for the hardships that U.S. 
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duties wrought on Prairie farmers, and offset issues of regionalism within Canada’s economy. 
On 26 April 1957, Diefenbaker explained:
The platform and policy of the Conservative Party is based on its abiding faith in 
freedom in the sovereign independence of Canada, in the assurance of equality of 
opportunity for all Canadians and in the resolute determination of the people and that 
no government should attempt to be their master.95 
In this speech, Diefenbaker displayed a particular concern for loss of control over the 
Canadian economy. After twenty-two years of Liberal administration, he emphasized how the 
processing of domestic resources had benefited the U.S. economy and American private 
businesses rather than Canadian enterprise. 
 The following day, the first of his intensive election campaign, Diefenbaker revealed 
to the press his vision for opening the Canadian north. In a speech delivered to more than 500 
campaign workers in Grimsby, Ontario, Diefenbaker stated that the Conservative party would 
lead Canadians to realize the new opportunities of northern development. Globe and Mail 
reporter Clark Davey wrote:
His campaign, Mr. Diefenbaker told the Grimsby audience, would spell out a great 
new plan for Canadians, not of things of the present, but of the future with a united 
Canada dedicated to new purposes and achievements. The Conservatives, he said, 
would show the Canadians of today how to be pioneers of the future and how to 
realize great new concepts of development particularly on the Northern frontier.96 
 Although northern development was not an integral component of the 1957 campaign, such 
speeches foreshadowed Diefenbaker’s later emphasis on Northern development. His early 
comments demonstrated that Diefenbaker was aware of the value of the North as a frontier 
territory for national development. 
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 During the 1957 campaign season, the Liberals developed a northern development 
platform to challenge the initial success of the Progressive Conservative party’s ‘National 
Development Policy.’ The Liberal government announced a $6 million budget increase for 
the Northwest Territories. Reportedly this was an attempt to make amends and acknowledge 
the economic situation of the North after being largely ignored by the Gordon Commission.97 
Their northern development strategy emphasized adapting Northern indigenous peoples to 
“civilized” life, improving the quality of educational and medical services. Unlike the 
Conservative’s ‘National Development Policy,’ the Liberal strategy displayed a greater 
concern for the social welfare of northerners. For Canadians voters, however, the concessions 
were interpreted as a stopgap attempt to draw attention away from Diefenbaker.
The Liberal northern development strategy promised to expand the existing territorial 
budget and focussed on resolving education, medical, and welfare imperatives. For example, 
the Liberals promised a $894,000 increase in educational expenditures that would expand 
their “One School” system, a project to build single-teacher schools in remote areas of the 
Canadian north.98 Aboriginal children were “made unfit to live in the land camps which are 
their homes...but they are not adequately prepared to make a successful transition to wage 
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work in town,” one observer noted.99 The Liberals also promised a $368,000 increase for 
Northern health and welfare services, compared to the $700,000 increase to national health 
and welfare services.This would expand wholesale medical treatments to indigenous 
communities, especially to remedy outbreaks of tuberculosis in isolated communities, 
guarantee free dental care, and cover medical costs for disabled indigenous children.100 In 
addition, the Liberals made a commitment to encourage the regional development of the 
North. Deputy Minister of NANR Gordon Robertson announced $4.8 million investment for 
the construction of buildings, land purchases and equipment Indigenous peoples were cited 
as the primary beneficiaries of these increased expenditures. Unlike the Conservative’s 
strategy, there was no formal outline of how the Liberals planned to expand transportation 
networks or railroads.101 Nevertheless, transportation had become the premier issue in the 
Canadian north. The lack of infrastructure and transportation services arrested further 
developments and the expansion of civil services. 
The Liberal government’s emphasis on social expenditures was a calculated response 
to its recent embarrassment over the Trans-Canadian Pipeline. The pipeline debate of 1956 
began as a procedural issue but became a symbol of Liberal arrogance and complacency.  In 
May, Minister of Finance C.D. Howe introduced a government bill to loan Trans-Canada 
Pipe Lines Limited, a company controlled by American financial interests, $80 million in 
federal funds to construct a pipeline from Quebec to Alberta. When it was revealed in late 
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April that the funds could not be raised in time and construction would not begin by the 
appointed deadline, the Opposition chastised the Liberals for forcing the bill through the 
House of Commons. The Conservatives criticized Howe for violating the rights of Parliament 
and asserted that the $80 million loan was not in the interest of Canadians taxpayers. As a 
direct result, the Liberal party fell 10 per cent in public support.102 Afterwards, regional 
economic development was a sensitive political issue for the Liberals. During the 1957 
campaign, Howe attempted to avert bad press by claiming that “no country in the world [had] 
developed so rapidly in the last 10 years.”103
 During the 1957 campaign, another decisive issue between Prime Minister St. 
Laurent and Diefenbaker was the direction of national development and the extent of 
American investment in the Canadian economy.104 Prior to the 1957 federal election, the 
Gordon Commission released its extensive recommendations on political and economic 
matters, including the economic relations between the United States and Canada.105 During 
his campaign, Diefenbaker asserted:
We hear nothing about the Gordon report as to what the Government  intends to do. Is 
the report  to be embalmed? There has been a thunderous silence on the part of the 
Government with respect  to the action that it intends to take in this regard…Canada 
should have a national policy which would prevent  foreign capital from furthering the 
process of economic integration with the United States and ultimately undermining 
Canada’s national identity.106
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Diefenbaker’s interpretation of the Gordon Commission findings played to his inherent 
political value for national development. The recommendations encouraged the ‘National 
Development Policy’ that Diefenbaker, Menzies, and Hamilton were preparing as a key 
principle of the Progressive Conservative Party’s upcoming platform.
 Months before the June election, Diefenbaker announced his intentions to divert 15 
per cent of Canada’s trade from the United States to the United Kingdom.107 Diefenbaker was 
particularly sensitive to the financial worries of western Canadians who were undermined by 
preferential tariffs on U.S. agriculture approved by the Liberal administration.108 Diefenbaker 
had strongly advocated for farm parity within his party and in the House of Commons. His 
platform criticized the Liberals for the concentration of taxation in the Federal government 
and promised a revised tax structure.109 According to newspaper reports, Diefenbaker 
believed that the Liberals’ preoccupation with industrial projects was the main reason for 
Canadians’ dissatisfaction with the current government and ongoing federal-provincial 
disputes.110 Diefenbaker’s campaign speeches reflected these opinions and were intended for 
ambivalent Quebec, Prairie and Maritime residents.
 As a longtime resident of Prince Albert, Saskatchewan, Diefenbaker believed that he 
represented Canadians who lived outside of the central provinces, especially farmers who he 
considered to represent the backbone of the Canadian economy. Diefenbaker affirmed that 
the objective of his ‘Canada First’ policy was to end the imminent threat that foreign interest 
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posed to Canada’s economic sovereignty and to deliver control over the economy back into 
the hands of domestic industry.111 In addition, Diefenbaker hoped that his economic policies 
would help reinvigorate Conservative Canadian nationalism.112
 Diefenbaker, Menzies and Hamilton devoted the ‘National Development Policy’ to 
continuing Sir John A. Macdonald’s vision of northwest expansion. Historian Donald G. 
Creighton had recently completed and published a two-part biography of Sir John A. 
Macdonald which rooted the first prime minister’s Toryism in a distinct vision for Canada’s 
nationhood and national development. This vision seemed to apply as much to the late 19th 
century as it did to the 1950s and gained renewed confidence with the achievement of 
Diefenbaker’s ‘National Development Policy.’113 “Sir John A. Macdonald’s national policy 
provided the framework for an integrated transcontinental economy,” Creighton wrote, and it 
seemed that his enduring tradition that was meant to be undertaken by future Conservative 
governments.114
 The Liberals were forced to respond to the growing nationalism which Diefenbaker’s 
oratory provoked in the late 1950s. In the months prior to the 10 June 1957 election, 
‘national unity’ and ‘regional development’ became the main issues in the Conservatives’ 
election campaign. St. Laurent was unable to differentiate the Liberal development strategy 
from the bold promises Diefenbaker set forth in his ‘Canada First’ policy. In an article 
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entitled “All National Unity, but Never a Tory” published in Globe & Mail, the Prime 
Minister commented on the problems of national unity, but failed to convey the commitment 
and distinction of Diefenbaker’s rhetoric. St. Laurent claimed:
National unity...in effect, has been and always will be the fundamental problem of 
national Government in Canada. There will be diversity, but there must  be an 
underlying unity or else truly national development and progress become impossible. 
National unity is a fragile growth easily blighted by wrong policies, not to be 
legislated but only encouraged by right Government action.115 
Several days later, Diefenbaker responded in the House of Commons:
We do not  want a day to day course wherein there are great developments in Canada 
depending on the world situation, but a plan; not  a planned economy but  a national 
policy; not  a policy of nationalism but one whereby Canada in the days ahead will 
remain an independent Canada and will not  inexorably drift into economic 
continentalism; one whereby Canada will maintain her economic independence and 
our effective national sovereignty.116
St. Laurent lacked Diefenbaker’s ability to cast and address local issues as national 
problems.117 Unable to counter or address the topic of national development and regional 
inequalities, the Liberals allowed Diefenbaker's ‘Canada First’ policy to set the tone and pace 
of the 1957 election.118
 On 11 June 1957, the Conservatives defeated the Liberals after twenty-two years in 
office and five consecutive terms in government. Although Diefenbaker only won a minority 
government, his support was nationwide. Immediately following the election results, 
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Diefenbaker promised that another election would be called in a year so that he could attempt 
for a majority government.119 
1958: Part One, The Success of John G. Diefenbaker and his vision of the Canadian north
  On 12 February 1958, Diefenbaker began his election campaign with a speech 
delivered to a crowded Winnipeg Auditorium filled with five thousand supporters, eight 
hundred others huddled in the nearby Concert Hall, and hundreds turned away. He began by 
renewing his pledge that a majority Conservative government would make a dramatic change 
in governance: 
We called the election because it was called for. Called for, by the need of a stable 
government to face the larger problems now facing Canada on a long-term basis. 
Called for, because the people of Canada as a whole realize that  the possibility of a 
strong and effective government cannot  be achieved without there being a majority. 
No government, and I underline this, no government  can grapple with major 
problems requiring long term planning while in a minority.120
The Prime Minister proceeded to give the audience a preview of his Party’s objective in 
government. “We ask from you a mandate: a new and a stronger mandate, to pursue the 
planning and to carry out fruition our new national development programme for Canada.”121 
He dismissed the Liberal party’s ability to promote national development. “For years we 
raised that in the House of Commons, and those in authority ridiculed it,” he asserted. “Day 
before yesterday, Mr. Pearson came out in favour of a national development policy...Why 
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didn’t they do it when in power?”122  Diefenbaker then announced his ‘Northern Vision,’ 
which was formally referred to as the ‘National Development Policy’: 
This national development  policy will create a new sense of national purpose and 
national destiny. One Canada. One Canada, wherein Canadians will have preserved to 
them the control of their own economic and political destiny. Sir John A. Macdonald 
gave his life to this party. He opened the West. He saw Canada from East  to West. I 
see a new Canada - a Canada of the North.123
The central focus of the ‘National Development Policy’ was northern Canada. In his 
‘Northern Vision’ speech, as it became known, Diefenbaker introduced several plans to 
improve the Canadian economy, including natural resource development, transportation and 
communication. First, Diefenbaker stated:
We will assist the provinces with their co-operation in the conservation of the 
renewable natural resources. We will aid in projects which are self-liquidating. We 
will aid in projects which, while not self-liquidating, will lead to the development of 
the natural resources for the opening of Canada’s northland. We will open that 
northland for development by improving transportation and communication and by 
the development of power, by building access roads.124
Diefenbaker felt that economic development of the Canadian north would benefit all 
Canadians.125 He proudly announced that the Government would maintain Canadian 
sovereignty in the Arctic, and he insisted that the policy would encourage Canadian resource 
development rather than foreign exploitation. Second, Diefenbaker announced the ‘Roads to 
Resources’ program, an immense construction project for the northern territories:
I think of a vast  programme on Frobisher Bay on Baffin Island in the Canadian 
Arctic, hiding resources that Canadians have little realization of. We intend to start a 
vast  roads programme for the Yukon and Northwest  Territories which will open for 





125 Ibid. The ‘National Development Policy’ was intended to create job opportunities for people of all regions. 
Diefenbaker encouraged Canadians to take on greater participation in the Canadian economy. “This is the 
vision. Canadians, realize your opportunities!” he went on. “We will ensure that Canada’s national resources are 
used to benefit Canadians and that Canadians have an opportunity to participate in Canada’s development.”
We will also launch, what  I said a moment ago, the $75,000,000 joint  federal-
provincial programme to build access roads.126
 This commitment to building northern roads also included the previously announced Pine 
Point Railway. For years the project had been tabled by the St.Laurent government to 
accommodate projects with a more calculated benefit to Canadians. Diefenbaker, however, 
understood that the construction of commercial rail lines in Northern Canada would assist the 
exploitation of northern resources.127 Third, Diefenbaker saw the opening of the region as a 
continuation of the nation-building process initiated by Sir John A. Macdonald. His speech 
transformed the North from a remote, underdeveloped region to the key to Canada’s national 
destiny:
Completion of the Confederation by developing a self-governing North. It will mean 
capital investment by Canadians and by foreign investors of many millions of dollars. 
It  will assure to Canadians that renewable resource will be renewed. It is for those 
things that I ask a mandate, not giving you tonight  the whole picture at all, by any 
means but  giving you something of the vision as I see it. The reason that  I appeal to 
the Canadian people, a mandate for a clear majority. You set a pace for Manitoba last 
time. Give us a few more. We need a clear majority to carry out this long-range plan, 
this great design, this blueprint  for the Canada which her resources make possible.  I 
want to see Canadians given a transcending sense of national purpose, such as 
Macdonald gave in his day.128
In a region where marginal transportation and communication developments had occurred 
previously, Diefenbaker set high expectations for the next five to seven years. 
 The fundamental message of Diefenbaker’s ‘Northern Vision’ speech was the 
symbolic and national importance of the North. Running throughout it was the concept that 
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the North is Canada and its resources exist to benefit all Canadians. As Sherill E. Grace 
explained in her 2002 study Canada and the Idea of the North, “even though it may be to 
scoff or to pick holes in Diefenbaker’s rhetoric and logic from the practical perspectives of 
policy and implementation, as a statement in the discursive formation of the North this 
speech is a classic.”129 According to Frances Abele, the postwar federal approach bore the 
stamp of Canada’s Tory beginnings; the ‘Northern Vision’ represented the “extension of full-
scale administration to the territorial North” and, like western Canada fifty years earlier, the 
North would provide staple export commodities for the entire nation.130  A careful review of 
the primary evidence bears out their observations.
 Throughout the campaign, Diefenbaker’s electoral pledge was reiterated in many of 
Canada’s major periodicals. In a full page advertisement, the Prime Minister clarified the 
main principle of the ‘National Development Policy’:
In the short  space of eight  months, the Government, in which it is my privilege to 
serve as Prime Minister, has laid the foundations for a new National Development 
Policy to equalize opportunity and raise the standard of living of Canadians in all our 
provinces. In doing so, we believe we have honoured our promises in keeping with 
your mandate of last June...We have taken measures to find new markets for our 
wheat and other farm products and to recover export  markets which had been 
drastically reduced while our resources were being exported in raw or semi-processed 
form.131 
The exploitation of northern natural resources would invigorate the national economy, 
generate new job opportunities for Canadian businesses, expand the North’s regional 
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economy, and pull Canada out of the recession. A 1958 Gallup Poll indicated that Canadians 
believed the Conservatives were set to build a truly national party.132
 To convince Canadians to vote in a majority Conservative government that would 
fulfill its bold ‘National Development Policy,’ Diefenbaker sought to demonstrate strong and 
determined leadership that balanced national and regional interests. The Globe & Mail editor 
stated:
Here is Canada’s opportunity to vote for something positive and dynamic something 
bigger and bolder than individual security - yet something which will make every 
individual more secure. For the real basis of individual security, social security, 
whatever one wishes to call it, is a nation’s wealth. The Conservative program aims, 
through expansion, to increase and diversify Canada’s wealth so that  we can at least 
count on keeping such security as we have carved out for ourselves; and be able to 
count on the prospects of further improving it. To vote for the Conservative 
Government is thus to vote, at one time, both for a secure future and for an 
adventurous one, both for enjoyed stability and for enjoyable progress, to vote in 
short for the things most Canadians want most.133
By 17 March 1958, the polls predicted a clear victory for the Conservative government.134 
Canadian voters believed that Diefenbaker’s government was getting things done.135 
According to J.M. Beck, Diefenbaker placed great faith in the accuracy of the poll and felt 
confident that his government would prevail.136
 The Conservative’s 1958 election victory was the most resounding in Canadian 
history. The party won 208 of 265 seats and a clear majority in every province except for 
Newfoundland, including clean sweeps in four provinces. The party took Prince Edward 
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Island with an unprecedented 62.2% of the popular vote; achieved all of Nova Scotia’s seats 
for the first time since Confederation; won 7 of New Brunswick’s 10 seats; and raised its 
support in Nova Scotia from 37.8% to 45.2%. In Ontario, the Conservatives took 67 of 85 
seats, and 56.4% of the popular vote. This political success continued throughout the Prairies. 
In both Manitoba and Alberta, the Conservatives reclaimed all the available seats from the 
Liberals and CCF. In Diefenbaker’s home province of Saskatchewan, the Conservatives won 
16 of 17 seats and 59.9% of the popular vote. The Conservatives also did well in British 
Columbia, attaining 18 of 22 seats. The two seats shared by the Yukon and Northwest 
Territories were split between the Liberal and Conservative parties. The most overwhelming 
and surprising regional success of the 1958 election was the Conservatives Party’s support in 
Quebec. In contrast to the outcome of the previous election, the Conservatives won 50 of the 
75 seats available and 49.6% of the popular vote.137 With popular support nationwide, 
Diefenbaker had a strong mandate to implement his ‘Northern Vision’ immediately.
 The ‘National Development Policy’ fit with the government’s focus on improving the 
national economy. In 1958, Canadians were particularly attentive to economic affairs. In the 
months after the election, Diefenbaker claimed, “(a) reasonable degree of stability in prices 
must go hand in hand with the relatively full utilization of available resources if we, in 
Canada, are to exploit to the full the tremendous opportunities for further development which 
lie ahead.”138 This was a plea for the support of Canadian industry during the economic 
recession, and for their support of the ‘National Development Policy.’ After all, Diefenbaker 
believed that as the world population increased, Canada’s abundant natural resources would 
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be in high demand in a “resource-failing” world economy. The first published outline of the 
‘National Development Policy’ affirmed this notion. Diefenbaker wrote, 
The challenge of Communism now and in the years ahead demands that our vast 
northern resources be made accessible and available to industry, for vast resources 
undeveloped and hidden in the earth will not fashion or forge the shield of freedom or 
contribute to the survival of the Free World.139 
Canada would be looked upon to supply and maintain the large-scale manufacturing and 
production of western nations. As the global demand for natural resources increased, it was 
crucial that the Government foster a close relationship with Canadian industry to assure 
future development and exploitation in the North. 
  Diefenbaker’s ‘Vision’ sought partnership and mutual benefit for Canadian private 
businesses and the government, but did not promise immediate returns on the investments. 
The ‘National Development Policy’ was, in essence, a contract between the public, the 
private sector, and the government. Positive results from this long-term economic policy 
would take time and large expenditures. In 1958, the government did not establish any new 
geological surveys for the North and resolved to develop the existing discoveries of lead-zinc 
deposit at Pine Point near Great Slave Lake and oil fields at the Eagle Plains northeast of 
Dawson City. After all, roads and highways still needed to be constructed to access these 
undeveloped areas of resource wealth and the government predicted that new deposits would 
be found nearby.
 The issue of northern transportation sparked debate in November 1957, when the 
Commissioner of the Canadian north, R.G Robertson, reported that a railway to Pine Point 
would cost about $65 million and feeder roads an additional $20 million. Diefenbaker 
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realized that the high expenditures of the ‘Roads to Resources’ program was a visible issue 
for Canadians and could jeopardize his long-term national development objectives.140 
Northerners felt that without strong federal support for northern development, the natural 
resource extraction projects and road construction Diefenbaker promised would never 
materialize. Provincial governments were more inclined to develop infrastructure and roads 
that were an asset to provincial economies and less concerned with the North’s regional 
development.141 
 In February 1958, Alvin Hamilton, the Minister of NANR, made his first visit to the 
Canadian north. The Minister took the opportunity to discuss with Northerners the 
government’s ‘Vision’ and to learn about permafrost, gravel, transportation and mining 
activities.142 A year later, Hamilton returned to the Yukon and reported on how the public’s 
response to the ‘Northern Vision’ had changed in a year’s time. In correspondence with 
Diefenbaker, Hamilton stated: 
The first  impression one gets is the tremendous bustle of activity and the changed 
attitude of the people. Last February in the Yukon there was a strong cynicism about 
our Northern Development  Program. By word and act people gave me the 
impression that they had heard all this before. With the visible signs of activity by 
oil and gas companies, mining companies, private business moving into these 
communities, there is a new interest  and enthusiasm that  is very encouraging to me 
personally. In Dawson, where I was met last year with a long list  of thing that 
(Northerners) wanted, this year the Board of Trade put  on a reception and dinner 
and had nothing but thanks and words of appreciation for what  had been done…
They spoke of the increased tourist  traffic, the road building program, and above all 
the impetus given by private enterprise working out of their communities. The same 
feeling was present at Whitehorse.143
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Hamilton reported positive results for northern development across the board. Progress had 
been made in expanding a range of housing and transportation facilities throughout the 
territories and, from the Minister’s personal account, the government’s ability to attract 
private businesses and industry to the North was particularly beneficial to the regional 
economy. 
 In September, Diefenbaker became the first Prime Minister to visit the Canadian 
Arctic. He and his wife, Olive, travelled through the Yukon Territory, met with local 
Northerners, and enjoyed a taste of Arctic recreation. In Whitehorse, he swapped stories with 
local men, visited the cabin of Sam McGee, and stopped by the office of the town newspaper, 
where a sign read “Hello John from the Whitehorse Star, published every Thursday if the 
staff is sober.”144  Diefenbaker also toured the sites for the new national health and welfare 
hospital and the 15,000 horsepower hydroelectric facility along the Whitehorse rapids.145 His 
last stop was 60 miles outside of Whitehorse where, on early Saturday morning, Diefenbaker 
spent the afternoon fishing and caught nearly 25 trout.146
 The trip was one of little fanfare or ceremony. Few speeches were made, there was no 
mention of the ‘National Development Policy,’ and many northerners were treated to an 
informal encounter with the Prime Minister.147 The casual and recreational tone of this trip 
demonstrated little political posturing on Diefenbaker’s behalf, but it was a symbolic 
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demonstration to Northerners that the Conservative government was aware of their 
existence.148
 The postwar coverage of the Canadian north reinforced the stereotypical imagery of 
this territory as a barren, uninhabitable, and isolated winter desert including the peoples who 
would live in such a harsh environment. Reports of violence amongst Aboriginal people 
frequently ran in the Canadian press. A 21 February 1958 article reported the violent deaths 
of two Eskimos and a child in the “barren” Keewatin districts of the Northwest Territories. 
This violence prompted the government to relocate an entire band of Eskimos 200 miles 
from their traditional grounds, under the supervision of R.A.J. Phillips, chief of the 
DNANR’s Northern Affairs Branch.149  Through education programs, jobs, and contact with 
government agents, officials hoped to advance indigenous civilization and bring this violent 
frontier into line.
 In a swift political move, the Conservatives criticized past Liberal administrations for 
their faltering support of Arctic research. The government cited past negligence as a chief 
reason for its difficulty in getting development projects off the ground. “Canada, thanks to 
the previous Liberal Government, has too long maintained an attitude of indifference to 
Russian exploration of the Arctic ocean and development of permanent settlement along its 
shores,” Globe & Mail editor Oakley Dalgleish stated. “When the DNANR was formed in 
1953, Prime Minister St. Laurent’s chief concern was the maintenance of Canada’s 
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sovereignty in the North.”150 Canada had only taken interest in the Arctic when its 
sovereignty was in jeopardy. Diefenbaker found that the dearth of research and insufficient 
number of Canadian defence facilities undermined the government’s ability to monitor its 
northern territories. Expanding transportation facilities and roads into the North would pave 
the way for increased settlement and occupation as far as the Arctic Ocean littoral. In short, 
the ‘Northern Vision’ sought to achieve what past Liberal policies failed to realize.
 Given the significance of northern issues in the 1958 election campaign, it was 
certain that preference and concessions would to be given to Yukon Territory and the 
Northwest Territories when the Conservatives won a majority government. George Hees, the 
Minister for Transportation, announced in January that his department would begin 
development on nuclear powered icebreakers to allow year-round shipping operations in the 
North. “We have come to realize ice breaking is very important,” Hees explained; “the more 
water and ports you can keep open the more people you can keep employed.”151 The Arctic 
icebreaker project was a clear example of how Diefenbaker’s Cabinet welcomed innovative 
ideas and how various ministries were involved in northern development. 
 In April 1958, DNANR published a fifty-four page booklet entitled “This is the 
Arctic,” which was intended to deepen the public’s understanding of the government’s 
vision. The booklet reiterated its commitment to develop northern communities and 
invigorate the national economy. The booklet surveyed various topics concerning the Arctic: 
geography, climate, people, resources, law, and future prospects. “There are great 
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opportunities awaiting ordinary, everyday people who are willing to make their homes above 
the tree line,” the booklet explained, “Modern techniques and inventions have made life in 
the North comfortable, the North will increasingly important not merely from a military 
viewpoint, but in the national economy.”152 Canadians remained reluctant, given the immense 
expenditures required to achieve Diefenbaker’s vision for the Canadian north, and provincial 
governments were concerned that their natural resources would be overlooked.153 Even 
though Diefenbaker enacted a bold economic strategy at time of public acclaim nationwide, 
rising expenditures and insufficient preparation threatened the full-implementation of his 
vision. The Diefenbaker government had not yet fully realized the level of preparedness, 
research and time needed to implement the ‘National Development Policy’ in the North.
1958: Part Two, Northern Politics and Issues in the Federal Setting
 Canadian administration of the North has, at times, been callously referred to as that 
of an ‘absentee landlord’ intermittently intervening in territorial affairs under the auspices of 
national policies or in reaction to perceived threats to domestic sovereignty. In August 1958, 
a security debacle occurred between Canada and the United States in which DNANR 
minister Alvin Hamilton admitted the matter as one of “national chagrin”.154 The Canadian 
Press reported the incident as a “security freeze out”; the Canadian government had been 
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denied access to joint-American and Canadian defence facilities in the North (particularly the 
DEW Line stations) and Canadian officials were required to seek written permission from the 
United States prior to any visits. “I am ashamed of the fact that through circumstance beyond 
the power of almost anyone here we have had to share responsibilities, in fact, give all 
responsibility for the defence of our northern areas to a friendly power,” Hamilton 
responded.155 He worried that Canada had been relegated to a mere spectator in its own 
affairs.
 This incident embarrassed the government. Diefenbaker’s ‘Northern Vision’ platform 
was largely an attempt to make the North accessible to private development and depended on 
the guarantee that both the government and commercial enterprise had full and unrestricted 
access to the region. The United States’ perceived encroachment on Canada’s sovereignty 
suggested diverging views between two neighbouring countries: the Canadian understanding 
of the North was as a region intrinsic to our cultural and national identity, while the United 
States saw it as the exposed flank of North American defence.156 Globe & Mail reporter 
Clark Davey wrote:
Most  countries in the world accept  this sector principle as applied to Arctic 
boundaries, but  the US does not. Sovereignty, in the opinion of Washington, is 
established only by effective occupation and control. Most  of the islands north of the 
Canadian mainland are uninhabited, and the US does not accept the theory of 
absentee landlord.157
One solution to this problem was a call for the increased occupation of the Arctic 
Archipelago, a long-standing objective of both Diefenbaker and DNANR. The government 
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expected that enthusiasm for the ‘National Development Policy’ and employment 
opportunities would attract labourers to the North and would increase the region’s permanent 
civilian population over time. In regional resource economies, however, the workforce 
tended to be largely transient or seasonal, except for Indigenous employees who often settled 
in the nearby vicinity of industrial resource operations.158 In these plans, Diefenbaker 
enjoyed the support of the Liberals across the floor of the House of Commons. On 15 August 
1958, Pearson reminded Diefenbaker that “Canada’s policy must be directed toward the 
extension of Canadian civilian occupancy and control of all Arctic activities.”159 
 The landscape of the Canadian north also began to change with the onset of resource 
development projects. Propelled by the ‘National Development Policy’ and the interest of 
private enterprise, there was a significant increase in surveying permits and deeds issued by 
the government.160 An interdepartmental committee responsible for investigating proposed 
construction plans noted an estimated $50 million in airline, military and civilian projects 
that were underway in this “land of opportunities” as early as January 1958.161 Federal 
experts concluded that Frobisher Bay, a former trading post and wartime air base, would 
grow into a modern community of at least 1,500 civilians within two years and 4,500 in 
five.162 
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 The government was immediately concerned with constructing basic facilities and 
housing to accommodate incoming labourers and industry heads. A report on the 
redevelopment of Frobisher Bay, published in The Financial Post, explained that the town 
needed an adequate water supply and lacked the basic infrastructure needed for prospective 
mining businesses. 163 In a press release issued by DNANR, Hamilton claimed that in the 
Eastern Arctic “a $60 million expenditure here of public and private money will trigger off 
between $200 to $300  of private investment, just as a $3 million road in the Yukon area will 
accelerate a $25 to $50 million exploration program by private companies.”164 The 
Government was more concerned with the concerns of private businesses than the North’s 
permanent residents, but the latter could still benefit from the amenities and employment that 
industrial operations and an influx of transient labourers brought to the North. 
 In February 1958, Hamilton announced plans to construct a road that would connect 
the Alaska Highway with the Arctic coast. The proposed road was expected to stretch from 
Keno Hill, Yukon, through the mountains to Tuktoyaktuk, Northwest Territories, near the 
mouth of the Mackenzie River. The construction of roads was expected to encourage the 
extraction and processing of the natural resources landlocked throughout the Canadian north 
and foster wider participation of private enterprise the process. In addition, Hamilton 
announced another road construction plan to reach the Arctic coast. The proposal was to 
build a road between Fort Rae and Coppermine, Northwest Territories, a distance of nearly 
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500 miles that travelled alongside mineral deposits near Great Slave Lake.165 Both projects 
were part of the ambitious ‘Roads to Resources’ program. According to Diefenbaker, the 
Conservatives would finance a $100 million road development program for both the Yukon 
and Northwest Territories, in addition to the proposed $75 million joint federal-provincial 
program which planned to build additional feeder roads in the northern regions of the 
provinces.166 Hamilton assured Canadians and Northerners that “these roads will not only 
make available for exploration potential resource rates of the provinces but will also tie in 
with our grid system to the territories.” 167
 Private enterprise had responded favourably to the ‘Northern Vision’ and ‘Roads to 
Resources’ program. In April 1958, Hamilton revealed that in the past seven months DNANR 
issued “more than 602 oil exploration permits…to about 200 different firms, including 
subsidiaries of the major companies.”168 This upsurge of construction, development projects 
and investment in the North opened the Government to new and modern ideas of advancing 
socioeconomic conditions. One such proposal that captured the imaginations of both 
politicians and the public was the potential for building a “small scale Manhattan” at 
Frobisher Bay.169 In an interview with Maclean’s magazine, Commissioner of the North R.G. 
Robertson suggested that within five years a $50 million development campaign could build 
“an interconnected grid of high-rising apartment and business towers to shelter 5,000 
people...A model city of multi-story apartment blocks linked by covered, heated passages 
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[as] planners say conventional houses would expose too many surfaces to storms.”170 At the 
time, this proposal was considered a modern approach to revitalizing the Eastern Arctic, 
developed by specialists with an understanding of how to develop the Arctic hinterland.
 Recognizing that the ‘National Development Policy’ was enacted under the auspices 
of Diefenbaker’s electoral win and Canada’s economic recession, the government was 
convinced that declining public interest for northern development would show. In a 1958 
edition of the Beaver, Robertson drafted an open address on the general development of the 
North. More notably, the Commissioner surveyed the misconceptions and rampant 
speculation that he felt was associated with northern development: 
The future development  of these undoubted resources depends on many factors. Of 
these, the short term decline in demand for base metals and the temporary surplus of 
oil are probably the least important. There is an inevitable human tendency to see 
the future through glasses that  are tinted by the lights and shadows of the present. 
Anyone trying to assess our northern future has to take care to ignore such 
ephemeral tints and colors. That future lies over a long time. It  is the continuing 
trend and tendencies that  will influence and determine it: not the short term 
waverings of the economic indicators...[The] main factor in the high costs of 
economic development  in the north (sic) not  the climate. If it were, we would be 
stuck, for we can do little about  it. Fortunately, something else (sic) is a problem 
that can be solved. The north is everywhere distant  from sources of supply and from 
markets. Even where facilities for transportation already exist, distance is important 
for every mile costs money. But  where the facilities do not  exist or are deficient  and 
this is the case through most  of the north remoteness is a much great  problem, for 
then the facilities have first  to be provided, and this in itself is enormously 
expensive. In the long run, the pressure of growing demand will undoubtedly result 
in higher prices for virtually all minerals...At some point  the price will in most cases 
exceed the high cost  of northern supplies even on the basis of present  techniques. 
Despite the present  high costs of transportation, mining has been for years an 
expanding industry in the north. For promoting its further growth the overriding 
necessity is that transportation facilities be expanded and improved. By reducing 
costs, better facilities will make more developments in the north economic, thereby 
creating the traffic which will reduce transportation costs still further. The central 
fact is that if means of transportation must  wait upon economic development  they 
will be slow in coming and so will economic development.171
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The additional benefit of this program was that it would increase the shipping of raw 
materials and goods between the provinces and territories, and make transportation 
easier for local residents of the North.
 The overlooked partner in this contract between government and private 
enterprise was the Canadian people. Canadians were shareholders to Canada’s national 
resources, the workforce needed for its extraction and processing, and the consumer of 
manufactured goods. In a speech Diefenbaker presented in Toronto on 20 August 1958, 
he stated:
It  is the clear duty of the government management at every level to put those 
assets to work so that they will earn for all Canadians the dividends necessary 
to raise the standard of living of every Canadian to a level commensurate with 
his or her proprietary interest in the vast resources. It is the responsibility of 
government to provide the climate and opportunity for the development of the 
potential wealth of this ninety per cent of Canada which still belongs to the 
Canadian people. It is the expression of a belief in the role of public or 
government enterprise as a necessary catalyst  for the fullest functioning of our 
system of private enterprise. It  envisages a policy of practical partnership of 
public and private enterprise in which the government  will find the necessary 
funds to overcome the initial problems of expanded communications and other 
essential public services. These are very real problems of resource 
development  int his country due to the great  central fact  of our national 
development, namely that Canada’s major resources are almost entirely land-
locked within the great mass of the northern half of this continent.172
A year later, Hamilton referenced Diefenbaker’s speech when he addressed members 
of Vancouver’s business community. He explained that the philosophy of the ‘National 
Development Policy’ were three incontrovertible principles. First, natural resources 
were the rightful property of the country as a whole, therefore obliging the government 
to ensure that profit was earned for “all Canadians”. Second, the role of the 
Government in natural resource development was not passive but dynamic. Third, 
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private enterprise had an essential role in the actual development of natural 
resources.173 The function of Government was to facilitate basic discovery and 
construction in the Canadian north. In 1959, the Government was implementing this 
philosophy through various projects and programs. The future of the Canadian north 
fell upon the shoulders of private companies and industry to carry out with the actual 
development, but the government need to prepare the policy foundation and incentives 
that would attract businesses to the North.
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Chapter Three
 The ‘Vision’ as Reality in the Canadian north
 By1960, the ‘National Development Policy’ encountered serious complications.  
Declining popular support for the Diefenbaker administration, the prime minister’s own 
resolve to continue with his economic strategy, and the overwhelming logistical challenge of 
developing transportation and resource operations in the North – which had proved too 
difficult and expensive - jeopardized the completion of all programs associated with the 
‘Vision.’ The same year, the Royal Commission on Government Organization (The Glassco 
Commission) made several recommendations on the issue of territorial administration. Its 
findings emphasized that DNANR had a restrictive effect on territorial administration and 
suggested that greater authority and responsibilities be devolved.174 The implementation of 
the ‘National Development Policy,’ however, depended on the federal government’s ability to 
intervene and direct northern economic development.
  A more pressing issue was the loss of support observed within the Conservative 
government. The Conservative party won the 1962 election but slid to a minority 
government, winning 116/265 seats nationally and 37.3 per cent of the popular vote.  This 
compared poorly to the 1958 results, when the party won 208 seats and 53.6 per cent of the 
popular vote.175 Without the same level of popular support and political capital, Diefenbaker 
feared that continuing with a rapid course of regional economic development would cripple 
his reputation with the Canadian people. Previously, Diefenbaker believed that the ‘Northern 
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Vision’ would be the source of his future acclaim and legacy.  By 1962, he feared that it 
would lead to his political undoing.
 Former public servant R.A.J. Phillips recalled that, as a result of the 1962 election, 
there was a 15 per cent reduction in DNANR staff. This hindered the department’s capacity 
to administer the North as it had prior to the election.  Accordingly, the bold promises and 
immense scale of development that Diefenbaker had envisaged now appeared unattainable.176 
Without adequate staff and resources, the second-stage of the ‘National Development Policy’ 
could not be implemented effectively. Diefenbaker’s northern development objectives were 
curtailed, and DNANR’s administration was under review. 
 When Lester B. Pearson’s Liberals toppled the Conservatives in the 1963 election, the 
implementation of Diefenbaker’s ‘Northern Vision’ was a low priority for the incoming 
government. The Liberals’ northern development policies were more oriented towards social 
welfare concerns than advancing the North’s economic integration with the rest of Canada. 
Moreover, the practices and objectives that Hamilton had installed after reorganizing 
DNANR in 1958 were supplanted by the antidevelopment policies and approach of the 
department’s Indian Affairs Branch - a division more closely aligned with the Liberal’s 
policy platform. When Arthur Laing became minister, he recognized that the North was “a 
problem area” for the Canadian government. Under his leadership, the ministry was 
restructured to better deal with socioeconomic issues and aboriginal affairs.177
This chapter examines the economic, political and logistical issues that impeded the 
implementation of the ‘National Development Policy.’ Many of the resource development 
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operations and road construction projects of the ‘Vision’ were initiated by the Diefenbaker 
government, but results were never fully achieved by the five to seven year target dates. This 
chapter surveys the wide range of complications that inhibited the realization of 
Diefenbaker's ‘Northern Vision’ and outlines the ensuing course of northern development 
during the 1960s and 1970s.
 Even though the essential characteristic of the ‘National Development Policy’ was the 
promotion of natural resource development in the Canadian north, Diefenbaker realized that 
the widespread underdevelopment of northern settlements was an equally grievous issue. 
Without facilities, housing, infrastructures and basic public services, the ‘National 
Development Policy’ would prove to be only a minor incentive in attracting private 
enterprise to the North. Through the 1940s and 1950s, the American government dedicated 
large expenditures and personnel to constructing the Alaska Highway, an all-weather 
highway to Whitehorse, and various defence projects, like the Pinetree Line and Mid-Canada 
Line. These developments only provided a minimum of access to remote and isolated regions 
in the North. The next stage of Diefenbaker’s ‘Northern Roads Programme’ was build site 
specific transportation access in areas that would trigger mining activity and resource 
development. The government expected that mining activity and government expenditures 
would promptly stimulate commercial activity for nearby northern settlements. In the cases 
of Frobisher Bay and Dawson City, the government had specific designs for the 
redevelopments of these Arctic settlements, which were meant to showcase the apogee of 
modern Arctic living and represent the culmination of ‘Vision’ planning and construction.
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 In the case of each ‘Northern Vision’ project, there were three critical features that the 
Diefenbaker government required in order to justify the high expenditures, planning and 
construction needed for its implementation. First, the potential for large-scale development of 
an economically-significant resource deposit was the most basic necessity for the 
Diefenbaker government. Second, the opportunity for economic spin-off, which resulted 
from government activity and investment benefiting the redevelopment of northern 
settlements. The indigenous and non-indigenous populations of the North were always 
considered the secondary beneficiaries of Diefenbaker’s northern development projects. 
Lastly, Diefenbaker anticipated that each project would produce long-term earnings for the 
Canadian economy as well as northern development. These first-stage ‘Northern Vision’ 
projects were considered to be only a minimum investment in northern development and 
hardly compared to the anticipated private expenditures and commercial activity these 
projects would trigger once completed. Ultimately, however, the ‘Northern Vision’ was a 
failed policy and, the high expectations for revenue and economic spin-off failed to 
materialize.
The Dempster Highway, 1958-1979
 The extraction of natural resources from the Eagle Plains in the Yukon depended upon 
large-scale federal aid.  The federal government had known about the existence of a large and 
economically-significant deposit of oil and gas in the Eagle Plains intermontane region, north 
of Dawson City, since the early 1950s. A DNANR report on the region’s economic prospects 
anticipated that the basin would become the most commercially developed petroleum-
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producing region in the Canadian north.178  In any case, a road would need to be first 
installed before any operations or exploitation of the reserve took place. When Alvin 
Hamilton became minister of DNANR in 1958, he assessed potential sites where the 
government could make serious investment into natural resources development and decided 
that development of the Eagle Plains would have a significant benefit for the Yukon’s 
regional economy.179 Moreover, a northern road to the basin could also have positive 
implications for local northerners. 
 After the launch of the ‘Northern Roads Programme,’ Hamilton announced that the 
first stage of the ‘Territorial Roads program’ would construct over 1,200 miles of new roads 
and six major bridges in the Yukon and Northwest Territories, estimated at a cost of over $31 
million.180  The first project would be the construction of a major road to the Eagle Plains. 
The road would depart from the Klondike Highway at Flat Creek, to ensure its integration 
with existing transportation system, and then would travel northwest 270 km to the southern 
edge of the Eagle Plains oil basin.181 In a press release which appeared in the “Canadian 
Economic Supplement” of the London Times, Hamilton explained that the development of 
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Eagle Plains deposit was the most promising economic activity currently underway in the 
North, and if commercial development proved successful, that the construction of the 
Dawson Highway would vindicate the ‘National Development Policy.’182 
 By 1960, the first 69 miles (110 km) of the highway was complete and an unfinished 
winter road allowed construction crews to enter the interior of the Eagle Plains, where the oil 
deposits were located. When the Diefenbaker government lost interest in the ‘National 
Development Policy’ by 1962, however, the federal government withdrew their funding of 
the Dawson Highway and the remaining 150 km were left incomplete. All federally-funded 
operations in the Dawson and Mackenzie region were placed on hold or abandoned. The 
partial highway served as an access road for exploration crews and a convenient route for 
local aboriginal hunters to reach the caribou herds that migrated annually through the area. 
This was hardly the original intention.
 The Dempster Highway was expected to be finished in five years at a cost of $5-8 
million. When the highway finally opened in 1979, nearly twenty years after its 
announcement, it cost nearly $103 million.  To the approval of Northerners, the highway was 
named after W.J.D. Dempster, a former RCMP officer who was then in his mid-eighties. 
Construction on northern highways resumed during the early 1970s, prompted by plans to 
build a natural gas pipeline from the Beaufort Sea through the Mackenzie Valley.  This made 
the Dempster Highway a vital access point to the Yukon interior.183
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The Pine Point Railway, 1958-1962
 Geologists and prospectors were aware of the presence of a sizable lead-zinc deposit 
along the south shore of Great Slave Lake since 1898, when the region was first mapped by a 
geological survey. The region experienced its first development boom after the discovery of 
gold along the north shore of Saskatchewan’s Lake Athabasca. This prompted another 
extensive geological survey of the Northwest Territories, which revealed unprecedented lead-
zinc mineral concentrations at Pine Point.184 The survey determined that the ore deposit was 
located approximately 45 miles (72 km) east of Hay river and 10 miles (16 km) south from 
Great Slave Lake. Departmental notes reveal that claim over this area was an ongoing 
competition amongst various private businesses and prospectors since 1914.185 Prior to 1945, 
several attempts to construct large-scale mining operations were financed, but ongoing 
competition and land disputes were not resolved until the late 1940s. 
The federal government first looked into building a railway to Pine Point in 1955, a 
year after the first mining operation was established.  In 1958, the Pine Point Railway was 
approved and listed as one of the main projects in the ‘National Development Policy.’ The 
railroad was considered to be the cheapest means to transport lead-zinc ore and concentrates 
from Pine Point to Trail, British Columbia, where Consolidate Mining (renamed Cominco in 
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1967) built their refinery operations.186 The railway became a sensitive political issue when 
advocates debated an eastern route, which would travel from Fort McMurray to Fort Smith 
and then Pine Point, and a western route from Grimshaw to Pine Point. The construction of 
the railway was expected to have a positive economic impact for communities along the 
proposed route.187
 In 1960, the Royal Commission on the Great Slave Lake Railway estimated that the 
operation of a railroad could transport nearly 215,000 or more tons of concentrates per year 
to Alberta. The railway depended on deposits of base mental ores, such as lead-zinc, copper, 
nickel and iron, present in a large enough quantity to be mined at a low cost and transported 
in large tonnages.188 Several potential sites for mineral extraction were found in the areas 
adjacent to the Pine Point railroad, but geologists and mining professionals were not 
convinced by the Government’s prediction that more economically-significant deposits 
would be found. The Commission recommended that the Government conduct further 
investigation before investing any more tax-money into the project.189 Eventually, the federal 
government resolved that the large lead-zinc deposit at Pine Point justified a railway because 
it, alone, would guarantee a return on the government's investment. A financial report 
included in the Commission predicted that, “the revenue accruing to the new portion of the 
railway would be some $1,321,000 per annum, which would increase as the production of 
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concentrates from Pine Point increased”.190 Moreover, the mining operation at Pine Pint 
would offset the declining incomes of Aboriginal people.191
In 1961, a committee agreed that the Pine Point Railway would depart from Roma, 
Alberta and travel north along the existing Mackenzie rail line to Great Slave Lake - 
construction ensued on the 432 mile (695 km) railroad.192 Three years later it was complete 
and the first trainloads of lead-zinc ore were shipped. The Pine Point Railroad was the most 
publicized and publicly recognized achievement of Diefenbaker’s ‘National Development 
Policy,’ and lauded for its rapid construction and immediate earnings. Nevertheless, 
Northerners alleged that the newly-constructed railroad contributed more to northern 
Alberta’s development than the Northwest Territories’ economy.193
 In June 1970, NANR contracted the University of Manitoba’s Centre for Settlement 
Studies to evaluate the impact of federal financial intervention on regional Native 
employment opportunities and the economic spinoff that mining operations had generated for 
the region. Paul Deprez, Professor of Economics at the University of Manitoba, reported in 
1973: 
It  is possible for economic growth to occur in a region without  resulting in significant 
beneficial effect  for the area in question. This appears at  an earlier stage to have 
happened in the Pine Point  development  program…As it transpired the development 
at  Pine Point appeared to have focussed heavily on natural resource development 
because of the supposed resultant  impact  on economic growth and economic 
development. Early planning did not  appear to have given the human element of the 
equation, especially the local native population, a high priority.194
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The construction of the Pine Point Railway stimulated mining activity but also disrupted the 
regional economy. The Diefenbaker government had failed to consult with neighbouring 
Native communities, and as a result were unable to share in the profits generated from federal 
investments in regional economic development. Local Aboriginal employment was decided 
on an ad hoc basis, and discriminatory hiring practices reflected the prevailing belief that 
industrial mining was too difficult and highly-technical for Aboriginal labourers.195
 According to Deprez, the absence of an employment philosophy and/or policy, with 
specific terms respecting the employment of Aboriginal people, indicated the lack of 
coordination between government planners and local officials. This suggested that the 
Canadian government was unconcerned with the regional implications that their ‘National 
Development Policy’ had for northern Aboriginal communities. Despite the federal 
government’s occasional comments, suggesting that Aboriginal Canadians would benefit 
from northern development and Diefenbaker’s assurance that the ‘National Development 
Policy’ would benefit all Canadians, the conditions at Pine Point suggested that integration of 
Aboriginals into the North’s structured, modern work force was a low priority for the federal 
government. The federal government’s plans for a new townsite at Pine Point ignored the 
possibility that Aboriginal people would relocate closer for access to social services and 
employment opportunities.196 His report found that with better town planning and more 
adequate, affordable housing, “the mine would have likely attracted much more native 
employment than was the case.”197
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 In Third World in the First, environmental studies scholar Elspeth Young explained 
that the development of mining towns had significant social implications for adjacent 
Aboriginal settlements. Mining towns were often owned or controlled by mining companies 
and were lodgings for labourers and employees – comprised mainly of non-indigenous 
people who migrated into the area from elsewhere.198 Nonetheless, modern entertainment, 
food, and services in these mining towns attracted indigenous people who resided in nearby 
settlements. Young found that, in many cases, the influx of this transient labour population 
and the cultural divide between mining employees and Aboriginal people resulted in 
misunderstandings, conflicts, and grave social consequences for Aboriginal communities.199 
The material and social characteristics of western culture disrupted traditional forms of social 
control within Aboriginal communities. Newcomers sought exploitive and temporary 
relations with Aboriginal people, and alcohol abuse devastated Aboriginal youth.200 Although 
there has been a marked improvement since the 1960s in the government’s awareness of 
Aboriginal issues and the harmful impact that resource operations can have on nearby 
settlements, both the government and mining industry has found it difficult to appropriately 
accommodate the interests of Aboriginal peoples in development plans.201
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Municipal and Town Redevelopment Projects in the Canadian north: Federal Plans for 
Frobisher Bay and Dawson City
 In “High modernism in the Arctic,” historian P. Whitney Lackenbauer and geographer 
Matthew Farish referred to the ‘Northern Vision’ as the “apogee of Arctic modernization in 
both dream and practice.”202 During the 1950s, emerging social scientific inquiry conducted 
by the Northern Co-ordination and Research Centre documented the transformation 
underway in northern communities, often a direct response to military modernization. 
According to Lackenbauer and Farish, the “identification of the post-war Arctic as an 
immense scientific laboratory was prompted not only by the desire for more accurate and 
comprehensive knowledge of an apparently unfamiliar environment - a modern impulse itself 
- but also by the belief that this knowledge might be relevant to future military 
campaigns.”203 The absence of any influential political constituency in the North meant that it 
was a safe testing ground. Canada’s nascent occupation and development of the North had 
encouraged social scientists to investigate the potentiality of modernizing northern 
settlements. By 1958, this scientific interest in redeveloping northern towns aligned with the 
Canadian government’s long-term systematic strategy for northern economic development.  
Indeed, the second stage of the ‘National Development Policy’ planned to redevelop and 
establish Frobisher Bay and Dawson City as the administrative centers of the Arctic, from 
which the federal government could better manage and extend northern development, 
transportation and communications.
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Frobisher Bay, Northwest Territories, 1957-1963 
 Frobisher Bay, located on the southern coast of Baffin Island, began as a settlement 
when a nearby United States airbase was established in 1942 and, eventually, acquired by 
Canada’s Department of Transportation in 1956. During the 1950s and 1960s, the nearby 
Arctic settlement depended on the economic spin-off that Canadian and American 
government agencies generated. According to historian Jeffrey David Noakes, whose thesis 
dissertation examined Defense Construction Limited and its role in Cold War defense 
projects of the Arctic, found that unlike other Arctic settlements at the time, the early 
expansion of Frobisher Bay involved no master planning.204 Urgent social and housing issues 
gradually emerged during the postwar period and by the 1950s, Ottawa politicians believed 
that the future thrust of federal policy in the Arctic would be in the direction of northern 
development.205 The development of the Arctic was not only in the interests of expanding 
Canadian nationhood, but a defence requirement during the Cold War. By the mid-1950s, the 
North became a critical region to Continental Defence, where both Canada and the United 
States invested major expenditures constructing various defence projects. 
 By 1957, Ottawa and Washington agreed on two defence projects for the Canadian 
Arctic. The Mid-Canada Line was recently completed and work was already underway to 
construct the DEW Line.206 Although both radar defence lines were vital to the early 
detection of Soviet bombers, the United States government sought permission from Ottawa 
to allow the construction of Strategic Air Command (SAC) refueling bases in Central and 
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Eastern Arctic. The construction of SAC bases in the Canadian Arctic could refuel United 
States Air Force (USAF) bombers en route to Soviet targets and would improve their range 
and effectiveness. In addition, the U.S. government planned to construct two tactical air 
navigation or TACAN stations on the East and West coasts of Northern Canada to aid flight 
navigation.207 From the earliest stages of planning, Frobisher was considered a suitable 
location for a SAC refueling base because of previous construction, its location along the 
Southwest coast of the Canadian Arctic and its accessibility by air and coastal 
transportation. 
 The 1957 election of John G. Diefenbaker was not a major impediment to the SAC 
refueling base program, even though the Progressive Conservative party platform 
emphasized the economic development of the Arctic rather than its militarization.208 A more 
serious issue for the U.S. government was Ottawa’s demand that Canadian contractors be 
used to construct the four SAC refueling bases planned for Churchill, Cold Lake, Namao and 
Frobisher Bay.209 This agreement favored Diefenbaker’s antagonistic feelings towards 
American businesses operating Canada as well as his ambitious plans to expand Canada’s 
presence further into the Arctic. 
 In February 1958, Diefenbaker announced his ‘Northern Vision’ and plan to build a 
modern Arctic settlement at Frobisher Bay.210 This new settlement was purported as the 
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apogee of Diefenbaker’s various northern development aims, would serve as the 
administrative centre for the Eastern Arctic and hub for both mining activity and Arctic 
transportation.  In an interview with Maclean’s magazine later that year, Commissioner of the 
North R.G. Robertson imagined within five years that private businesses would be able to 
construct “an interconnected grid of high-rising apartment and business towers to shelter 
5,000 people...A model city of multi-story apartment blocks linked by covered, heated 
passages.”211  For Canadian contractors working in the Arctic, the ‘Northern Vision’ opposed 
U.S. businesses and personnel acquring Canadian contracts and meant an increase in job 
opportunities for Canadian labour.
 The newly-acquired airfield and redeveloped settlement were meant to demonstrate 
the potential of modern Arctic living.  Frobisher Bay would be built up to include an 
international airport; housing designs, amenities and comforts that could be found in any 
southern Canadian city; and cultural integration between Inuit and non-Aboriginal people.212 
Diefenbaker expected that an innovative, modern northern city would encourage Canadians 
to relocate to the North, stimulate commercial activity, and galvanize development across the 
Arctic.
 In March 1958, D. Snowden, chief of the Northern Affairs Branch’s Industrial Arctic 
Division, delivered a speech to an audience at Carleton University regarding the ‘New North’ 
that the Canadian government was designing in the Arctic. Snowden explained that DNANR 
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planned to build a modern Arctic city at Frobisher Bay, even though the department had not 
made any public announcement about the project. He proclaimed:
It  will be the most revolutionary community in the country, perhaps on the 
continent…Today, architects and engineers are talking in terms of a new community 
shaped roughly like a snowflake. In the centre of the snowflake would be the stores, 
the bowling alleys, the newspaper and radio station, the hotel and restaurants, the 
banks, the airline offices, the movie theatre and cocktail lounge, and the other small 
enterprises that go to make up a modern community of more than 4,000 people. In 
addition, there will be offices of oil companies, airlines, and the government. In the 
outer arms might  be the accommodation unit reaching, like the central structure, 
several stories into the sky.213
The construction of this Arctic city was an ambitious and bold proposal that truly represented 
Diefenbaker’s pinnacle vision for Northern Canada. Within five years, the Canadian 
government expected that the Frobisher airfield could be transformed into an international 
airport that allowed stop-over for intercontinental flights. The ‘Northern Roads Programme‘ 
and ‘Roads to Resources’ program would help attract private industries to Frobisher and 
allow access the mineral resources expected to be found in the southern regions of Baffin 
Islands. Finally, once Frobisher Bay was established as the administrative centre of the 
Eastern Arctic, the government could manage and direct the economic boom that federal 
investments were expected to set off.214
 Building a modern hub was key to deliver federal programs in the eastern Arctic. 
Without an administrative centre to maintain and regulate economic activity within the 
region, a sound economic and industrial base could not established. In 1961, the Glassco 
Commission found that federal administration in the Arctic was complicated by the absence 
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of municipal and local governments. Although DNANR and territorial officials were 
scattered throughout the Arctic, local governments had a greater capacity to translate and 
apply government policy to local conditions. The Commission contended that the North was 
a society that “resembles neither that to which the natives have been accustomed nor that in 
which their administrators have been reared - and one, moreover, that is constantly 
changing.”215 The Commissioner’s comments clearly reflected the ambitious and rapid 
construction plans that DNANR proposed for Frobisher Bay.
  On 25 July 1961, the Canadian government announced a $120 million plan to build a 
permanent townsite at Frobisher Bay.  A DNANR press release laid out a redevelopment 
strategy to replace temporary buildings over a four year period and install a 20-bed hospital, 
16-room school, and a 120-occupant apartment building.216 Utilizing ‘modern scientific 
innovations,’ the government planned to build several high-rise, pre-cast concrete housing 
structures that would be interconnected by a system of covered passageways and pipes that 
would transmit basic utilities and heat throughout the town. The conservation of heat was a 
critical issue during the planning and designing phase. High-rise buildings were expected cut 
down the ground area required by the town and create a corresponding reduction in heating 
and service costs.217
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 Ultimately, this plan would not come to pass and Diefenbaker’s vision of Frobisher 
Bay was dismissed even before major construction began. Between 1961-63, a number of 
issues and problems arose that seriously questioned the Canadian government’s plans for 
Frobisher Bay. The first in a series of setback was the Soviets’ successful test of an 
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in August 1957, which eventually had significant 
implications for North American’s long-term defence plans. Even with the early warning 
detection that the DEW Line provided, a Soviet ICBM attack only gave SAC minutes for 
preparation whereas a conventional bomber attack would allow hours. By 1961, the necessity  
for SAC refueling bases had significantly decreased. American use of ICBMs had rendered 
the B-47 bomber and KC-97 refueling tanker obsolete.218 The SAC refueling base 
constructed at Frobisher Bay had cost $20, 847, 614.05, and was nearly double the cost of the 
base built at Churchill and more expensive that the Cold Lake and Namao bases combined.219 
In 1962, the Canadian government had long foreseen this happening and decided to 
reevaluate their plans for Frobisher Bay. In 1963, Canada acquired the SAC refueling base 
from the U.S. government and decided to transform it into a large administrative building to 
house all of Frobisher’s government employees.220
 Another unforeseen setback that brought Diefenbaker’s plans for Frobisher Bay into 
question was the declining importance of the Frobisher airfield to intercontinental travel. 
Following the Department of Transport’s takeover in 1957, the Frobisher airfield served as a 
refueling site and emergency stop-over for commercial airliners. As part of a great circle 
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route for Northern American and European travel, Frobisher would have benefited from the 
increasing numbers flights traveling over the Atlantic. The government expected that 
increased air traffic at the airfield would prompt more commercial and service activity in 
Frobisher Bay. These plans, however, were abandoned when long-range commercial jet 
airliners were introduced in 1960.221 Commercial aviation had developed far quicker than the 
government expected and airliners were now capable of intercontinental flights without the 
need for refueling stops. Shortly thereafter, the Frobisher airfield became inconsequential to 
North American air travel. 
 Lastly, the government’s expectation that the ‘Northern Roads Programme’ and the 
‘Roads to Resources’ program would trigger large-scale mining operations in Baffin Island 
proved unfounded. Similar to the setbacks that Diefenbaker’s ‘Northern Vision’ encountered, 
no economically-significant mineral deposits were discovered near Frobisher Bay. 
Geological surveys discovered high grade iron ore deposits at Mary River in north Baffin 
Island and major amounts of lead, zinc and sulfur in the Arctic Archipelago, however, none 
of the deposits were close enough to Frobisher and development was economically 
inadvisable.222 Moreover, this revelation caused the Canadian government to reconsider their 
plans to build a large administrative centre for the Eastern Arctic. Without the possibility of 
intercontinental air travel or growth of mining activity, the government saw little need for 
administrative centre to be paced in Frobisher Bay.
 Within several years, Diefenbaker’s ambitious plans for a modern Arctic city were 
effectively obsolete. The project had serious implications for Diefenbaker’s ‘National 
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Development Policy,’ which had dedicated enormous expenditures towards the construction 
of new roads, facilities, housing and an international airport at Frobisher Bay. Although this 
modernist vision of Frobisher Bay failed to materialize for a number of unforeseen issues and 
developments, due to reasons closely associated with the problems of the ‘Northern Vision,’ 
the redevelopment project was a public disappointment for the Diefenbaker administration 
and further injured the Prime Minister’s reputation between the 1962 and 1963 federal 
elections.223 
Dawson City, Yukon Territory, 1958-1966 
 Another region of interest to the Diefenbaker government was Dawson City, Yukon 
Territory. Situated at the confluence of the Klondike and Yukon rivers, Dawson City was the 
centre of mining activity during the Klondike Gold Rush. After the discovery of gold, the 
influx of prospectors rapidly transformed the townsite and, in a few short years, the crude 
buildings were replaced with retail services and an expanded settlement to accommodate the 
growing population. During the 1890s, Dawson City was at the heights of its prosperity and 
acquired a certain historic significance for its role in the Klondike Gold Rush. 
 From the 1920s until the late 1950s, a series of setbacks deteriorated Dawson City’s 
economic base. The construction of the Alaska Highway during the Second World War 
established a road link to Whitehorse, and in the process, diverted much of Dawson City’s 
economic potential and employment opportunities. In 1951, the government eventually was 
persuaded to transfer government agencies from Dawson City to Whitehorse. Without an all-
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weather road to Dawson City, travel was impossible during winter months and the federal 
government decided Whitehorse would replace Dawson City as the administrative centre of 
the Western Arctic. By 1953, aided by the newly-established DNANR, the transfer of 
government agencies to Whitehorse was complete.224 Without the job opportunities that 
government agencies employed, many local residents were forced to relocate to Whitehorse. 
With its declining population and loss of employment opportunities, Dawson City’s future 
appeared bleak.
 In 1958, Diefenbaker announced his ‘National Development Policy,’ which 
emphasized not only the economic value of the North, but reminded Canadians of the 
national historic significance of Dawson City and the Klondike Gold Rush.225 The federal 
government planned to construct an all-weather highway that would travel northwest from 
Dawson City to the Eagle Plains and Mackenzie Delta, eventually named the Dempster 
Highway. It was expected that the construction of this highway would bring renewed activity 
to the townsite. This was a significant investment for Dawson City and reinvigorated a 
townsite not long ago considered a temporary boomtown. At the same time, members of the 
local community, who eventually formed the Klondike Tourist Bureau, petitioned the 
Canadian government to recognize Dawson City as a culturally, if not historically significant 
townsite.226 The Klondike Tourist Bureau felt that it was the responsibility of the federal 
government to prevent the further deterioration of Dawson City’s historic buildings and 
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applied for financial assistance that would allow local members to preserve and restore 
buildings constructed during the Klondike Gold Rush.
 In September 1958, Diefenbaker visited Dawson City on his tour of the Western 
Arctic. Even though this may have been an attempt to reaffirm his northern development 
aims and campaign promises, perhaps while visiting Robert Service’s cabin did he realized 
first-hand the cultural significance of Dawson City.227 In tone with his vision of national 
development, Diefenbaker felt that Dawson City’s cultural heritage could be a major tourist 
attraction and planned a cultural celebration of July 1962, eventually named the Dawson City  
Festival. The festival would not only celebrate the history of Dawson City and the Klondike 
Gold Rush, but would feature Canadian and Northern arts, theatre and culture. DNANR was 
responsible for planning the festival and Hamilton had hired Tom Patterson, the founder of 
the Stratford Shakespeare Festival, to determine if Dawson could accommodate the event.228 
In 1959, Hamilton recommended that that the Historic Sites and Monument Board of Canada 
(HSMBC) preserve Dawson City’s historic buildings. In coordination with the local 
community, HSMBC restored Dawson City’s Palace Grande Theatre, Masonic Hall, old 
administration building and Robert Service’s cabin.229 The 1962 Dawson City Festival, 
however, was a financial failure. Nevertheless, it helped fund the restoration of a number 
historical buildings and demonstrated that with a clear restoration policy, remaining 
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commercial and residential areas could be reconstructed and Dawson City could attract 
tourists.230
 After the Dawson City Festival failed to meet expectations, Diefenbaker felt that 
Canadians were indifferent towards northern Canada. By 1962, declining public interest for 
northern development caused Diefenbaker and the Progressive Conservative party to 
reconsider following through with the ‘National Development Policy.’ The results of the 
1962 federal election further dissuaded Diefenbaker from implementing the second stage of 
his nation policy. Consequently, all major northern development activity was put on hold, and 
eventually rejected when Diefenbaker loss the 1963 federal election to Lester B. Pearson.
 Another setback to the redevelopment of Dawson City was in 1963, when the 
Diefenbaker government suspended construction on the Dempster Highway. Local residents 
were less concerned with a resumption of mining activity in the Eagle Plains and more 
concerned with potential spin-off effect that the Dempster Highway and northern 
transportation would have for Dawson City. Northerners expected that the all-weather 
highway would allow year-round freighting by way of Dawson City and assist tourism by 
attracting a greater number of visitors.
 In April 1965, DNANR established an inquiry to determine a redevelopment strategy 
for Dawson City that would prevent further economic deterioration and establish a sound 
economic base. Even though the Pearson government distanced itself from the northern 
development strategies of the former government, the new report similarly emphasized that 
an economically significant deposit of minerals, oil and gas near Dawson City would secure 
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long-term interest and reduce the chance of complete economic stagnation.231 Geological 
surveys identified some scattered deposits of gold, silver-lead, antimony, iron and coal 
directly north and along the Mackenzie Delta, but there was little evidence to predict that 
developments in the area would improve the regional economy.232 Accordingly, the major 
findings of this inquiry recommended that it was inadvisable for the Pearson government to 
redevelop Dawson City unless an economically-significant resource deposit was immediately 
found. Future redevelopment plans had to take into consideration Dawson’s socioeconomic 
condition, the absence of municipal infrastructure, and the limited population of 500 
permanent residents. The ‘Committee to Examine the Economic Potential of Dawson City 
Area’ recommended a redevelopment strategy to foster long-term economic development and 
resettlement:
1. A community plan must be development without delay to serve a reduced 
population estimated at two hundred to three hundred. The Commissioner should 
be asked to undertake a study to determine the optimum size and location of a 
concentrated commercial and residential areas;
2. Power, water and sewage services should be planned for the smaller settlement. 
(…) The extent of services that can be provided may in fact determine the future 
size of the town;
3. The Historic Sites Division should be asked to take an immediate and active 
interest in Dawson and prepare plans for the preservation of historic buildings 
before they decay further. The Committee is convinced that Dawson will become a 
tourist attraction capable of drawing relatively large numbers within the next 30-50 
years;
4. In conjunction with the Dawson restoration program, the Yukon Tourist 
Development Officer should be given whatever support is indicated to promote the 
Dawson area as a tourist attraction;
5. A re-settlement program should be development to encourage and assist some of 
the present citizens of Dawson City to relocate where employment possibilities are 
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greater. The cost of such a program will depend on the number of people that can 
be persuaded to move and the value of property they would leave behind;
6. The City Charter should be given up and local government should have a status 
comparable to a “Local Improvement District”;
7. The Commissioner of the Yukon should establish a Dawson Re-development 
Committee at Whitehorse to advise him and to co-ordinate the activities of all 
government agencies working in Dawson City;
8. Co-ordination and encouragement on the ground is necessary, therefore a contract 
employee should be hired immediately for a period of two years to act as Area 
Administrator.233
Moreover, the report recommended that the federal government consult with Dawson City’s 
permanent residents and determine their views on a variety of issues, including a possible 
reform of local government, the types of social programs to be initiated, the forms of 
economic development activities, and the amount of financial assistance necessary.234 The 
findings of this report, however, were not enough to persuade the Liberals to resume 
Diefenbaker’s northern development strategies and programs.
 By 1966, Northerners recognized that Dawson City would not attain the level 
renewed prosperity that Diefenbaker had envisaged in 1958. Despite the best efforts to 
restore Dawson City’s historical buildings, the vision of a redeveloped townsite would 
require increased expenditures and a more aggressive federal approach.235 The last in a series 
of economic setbacks for Dawson City was in 1966 when the Yukon Consolidated Gold 
Corporation (YCGC) closed. Since the transfer of government administration to Whitehorse, 
Dawson City relied upon its two remaining forms of income: its expanding tourism industry 
and regional mining activity. YCGC was the largest mining operation in the Yukon Territory 
and the largest employer of labourers in Dawson City. Moreover, YCGC was responsible for 
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maintaining Dawson City’s public services and supply of energy. The vacancy left by YCGC 
forced an already burdened municipality to relive more heavily upon the territorial and 
federal governments.236 In 1968, Parks Canada and HSMBC, in coordination with the 
municipal government, were placed in charge of Dawson City’s municipal redevelopment 
project. After DNANR approved the restoration of 13 historical buildings, the Dawson City 
National Historical Complex became the largest historical park constructed in Canada. Since, 
the role of municipal government in Dawson City’s planning and development has involved 
supporting and encouraging the private sector and tourism industry. Since the 1960s, tourism 
has accounted for the largest source of income in Dawson City.237
Conclusions
 The Diefenbaker government anticipated that the ‘Roads to Resources’ program and a 
minimum investment in northern economic development would trigger private expenditures 
and mining activity across the northern Canada. The expectation that many economically-
significant oil, mineral and gas deposits would be found in North was eventually proved 
false. The success of Diefenbaker’s ‘National Development Policy’ depended on the 
government discovering and developing natural resources in the North. When this did not 
come to pass, the Diefenbaker government encountered serious economic problems and 
cutback DNANR’s northern development plans.238
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 The results of the ‘National Development Policy’ did not attain the levels of northern 
economic development that Diefenbaker promised, but it did generate nationwide attention 
and concern for the underdeveloped North. The limited and minor achievements of the 
‘National Development Policy’ began the process of modern redevelopment and expansion in 
the Canadian north. Even though Diefenbaker’s escalating expectations for the North were 
ultimately proved false, the ‘National Development Policy’ demonstrated that a long-term 
development strategy based on the North’s natural resource could stimulate economic 
activity in the North.  Historically, the fundamental basis for the North’s regional economy 
has been mining and natural resource development. ‘Vision’ projects, like the Dempster 
Highway and Pine Point Railway, recognized the value and importance in constructing 
transportation access in the Canadian north. Although Northern transportation never 
developed to the point Diefenbaker envisaged, it succeeded in alleviating feelings of 
marginalization and isolation amongst Northerners and stimulated new economic activity in 
several Arctic settlements. With the construction of the Dempster Highway, Dawson City 
recovered from its decades of declining commerce and physical decay. Even though the 1962 
Dawson City Festival celebrated the Dawson’s cultural heritage and national importance, it 
was a financial disaster and disappointment to Diefenbaker and Hamilton after years of 
planning and investment. Likewise, the failed redevelopment of Frobisher Bay intended to 
demonstrate the merits of modern Arctic living. However, Frobisher’s declining importance 
to intercontinental air travel and the absence of mineral resources eventually led Diefenbaker 
to abandon his hopes of constructing an Arctic metropolis. In spite of these failed projects, it 
demonstrated that with careful planning and investment Arctic settlements could attract 
103
tourists and commercial businesses. Indeed, the recent political rhetoric by Stephen Harper 
and his “use it or lose it” approach to the North, which includes commitments to invest in 
infrastructure to prepare the North for more resource development and recognizes the vital 
benefit of Northern communities, promises to finally realize Diefenbaker’s ‘Northern 
Vision.’239
 The most prominent setback and complication to the ‘Northern Vision’ was the 
limited discovery of oil, gas and mineral deposits in the North. In principal, the ‘Roads to 
Resources’ program was an incredible means of unlocking the North’s resource potential, 
however, the Canadian government was unable discover any economically-significant 
resource deposits between 1957 and 1963.  After all, the lead-zinc deposit at Pine Point and 
scattered oil deposits near Dawson City were known to the Canadian government even 
before Diefenbaker developed his ‘National Development Policy.’ Without oil, gas and 
mineral deposits, the ‘National Development Policy’ stood little chance of attracting private 
industry, commercial businesses and Canadians to relocate to the North. It was only a matter 
of time before rising project expenditures and public criticism forced Diefenbaker to 
reevaluate his government’s commitment to northern development. With the cutbacks 
approved for DNANR, which included canceling all northern development plans and projects 
as well as a 15 per cent reduction in staff, the ‘Northern Vision’ swiftly disappeared from the 
Diefenbaker government’s agenda by 1962.240 In attempt to recover some popularity with 
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Canadians, Diefenbaker diverted his attention towards more pressing matters of foreign 
affairs, international military conflicts, and federal disputes.
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Conclusions
Reevaluating Diefenbaker’s ‘Northern Vision’
John George Diefenbaker, like Sir John A. Macdonald, was a Prime Minister 
with a dream, not just seeing the great expanse of the country, but the 
greatness that Canada and Canadians should aspire to. But he understood that 
to truly  fulfill our national dream we must accept the challenges and seize the 
opportunities presented by our North….
Prime Minister Diefenbaker is no longer with us, but  the geopolitical 
importance of the Arctic and Canada’s interests in it  have never been greater. 
This is why  our government has launched an ambitious Northern Agenda 
based on the timeless responsibility imposed by our national anthem, to keep 
the True North strong and free. To this end, we will encourage responsible 
development of the North’s abundant economic resources, we will ensure jobs 
and opportunity  and the health and good governance of Northern 
communities. We will protect the unique and fragile Arctic ecosystem for the 
generations to come. And of course, we will assert and defend Canada’s 
sovereignty and security in the region.
Rt. Hon. Stephen Harper, Inuvik, Northwest Territories, 28 August 2008241
 
 Despite implementation failures and abandoned initiatives, the ‘Northern Vision’ 
established a foothold for future social, political, and economic developments to occur in the 
North and many projects developed by the Diefenbaker administration were undertaken by 
consecutive governments. Like Sir John A. Macdonald, we recognize the critical role and 
work of Sir Wilfrid Laurier’s successive government to the completion of the ‘National 
Policy’. Despite previous scholarship, Canadians are unaware of the achievements and 
positive outcomes of Diefenbaker's ‘Vision’. Canadian historiography disregards 
Diefenbaker’s as a disappointed contribution to advance postwar development in the North, 
yet the failed commitment of subsequent governments and unrealistic expectations of 
improving regional social, economic, and political conditions of the North remains 
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overlooked. Diefenbaker’s extension of nation-building to the Canadian North is a process 
that continues and the legacy of his ‘Vision’ has a renewed consciousness in Canadian 
society today.
  The role of the Diefenbaker government in opening the Canadian north is an 
overlooked chapter in its postwar regional history. It occurred between periods where the 
North was increasingly seen as the ‘exposed flank’ of Northern American defence and 
subject to an occupation of the American military working jointly with the Canadian 
government, and the Pearson government’s expansion of social services and programs into 
the Canadian north during the 1960s. Given the innovative nature of the ‘Northern Vision’ 
and Diefenbaker’s ambition to incorporate the North within the Canadian state, this period is 
a watershed in the history of northern development and an overlooked dimension to the 
history of John G. Diefenbaker.
 The relationship between the ‘Northern Vision’ and Diefenbaker’s landslide victory in 
the 1958 Federal election cannot be divided. Whether its effects were direct or indirect to the 
electoral results are of inconsequence, the ‘Northern Vision’ and admissions of the Canadian 
north were present since the beginning of Diefenbaker’s election campaigns in 1957 and 
1958, and more importantly was announced as the foundation of the Progressive 
Conservative political platform at the inauguration of the Party’s election campaign in 
Winnipeg on 12 February 1958. Certainly, leadership was a decisive issue in the 1958 federal 
elections and can account for Diefenbaker’s nationwide support and popularity. After all, 
Canadians’ response to the ‘Northern Vision’ was overwhelming. The ‘National 
Development Policy’ presented Canadians with a clear strategy to revive the Canadian 
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economy from recession and prevent an eventual takeover by American businesses, and was 
a sharp contrast to the economic policies of Liberal administrations which Canadians felt was 
complacent and favourable to American economic designs.
 In 1958, the Canadian press reported extensively on the ‘Northern Vision’ and the 
emerging concerns of the Canadian north were a contentious and unforeseen issue that 
entered the federal political arena. It was a decisive issue that distinguished the political 
platform of the Progressive Conservative party from the Liberal’s economic development 
strategy. Furthermore, many Conservative politicians were increasingly distrustful of 
American personnel in the Canadian Arctic.  Diefenbaker’s appeal to opening the Canadian 
north revived Sir John A. Macdonald’s vision of national development and revealed the 
Prime Minister’s contestation for American economic takeover. Indisputably, Diefenbaker's 
‘Vision’ resonated with the economic and sovereignty concerns as well as nationalist fervor 
of Canadians nationwide.
  The ‘Northern Vision’ or ‘National Development Policy’ was a policy with strong 
political conviction from the onset of its design. It was a policy of national ambition, an 
adamant attempt to encourage regional economic development, and foster a wider financial 
participation from both the Canadian people and private enterprise in Canada’s resource 
economy. While it is true that the underdevelopment, lacking infrastructure, and sparse 
population of the Canadian north handicapped the success of Diefenbaker’s ‘Northern 
Vision,’ the most identifiable setback was the difficulty locating any economically significant 
deposits of oil, gas and mineral resources. The ‘National Development Policy’ depended on 
the extraction of northern natural resources for the benefit of “all Canadians” and when none 
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were found, rising public criticism for high expenditures and northern development projects 
that were inconsequential to the national economy eventually forced “the Chief” to abandon 
his northern strategy in 1962. In a region where meagre development had occurred 
previously, however, Diefenbaker’s vision of expanding transportation facilities, building 
roads and highways, and initiating various resource development operations was a bold and 
ambitious strategy that advanced political, economic and transportation imperatives in the 
North.
 This study has found that there is no definite conclusion to the ‘Northern Vision’. It is 
impermissible for this policy to be labeled a complete failure when positive outcomes were a 
result. The expectation that all objectives and promises of the ‘National Development Policy’ 
could be achieved in a single term in government was unreasonable. The ‘National 
Development Policy’ was a long-term economic strategy with few short-term and observable 
benefits for the national economy. Diefenbaker’s political failure was that he assured 
Canadians that within five to seven years the ‘National Development Policy’ would be 
complete. It did, however, demonstrate that tourism was new and vibrant source of income 
for northern settlements and, that government planning and crucial investments in 
transportation and resource development would benefit the general welfare and regional 
development of Arctic communities. The process of northern development initiated by the 
Diefenbaker government was never abandoned insofar as the potentialities and unrealized 
projects of the ‘Northern Vision’ were undertaken and carried through by subsequent 
Canadian governments. 
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 In terms of our government’s administration of the North over the past half century, 
the ‘Northern Vision’ was a significant achievement of northern development and a period of 
integration between northern and southern Canada. Subsequent governments have improved 
upon this initial policy, however, a more likely to advocate programs which address 
contemporary social, economic, and environmental issues. The ‘Northern Vision’ was a long-
term strategy to stimulate northern resource development; and a national policy which 
planned to expand Canadian nationhood and civil boundaries to the Far North. The ‘Roads to 
Resources’ program was an obvious accomplishment of the ‘Vision’ and continued to have a 
wide and lasting implication for the future development of the North. While each consecutive 
government has pledged bold promises to develop the vast natural resources of the North, 
many of the same issues and challenges which confronted Diefenbaker's ‘Northern Vision’ 
persist today. 
 A valuable questions is whether the most enduring element of the ‘Northern Vision’ 
was its ideological principles rather than its political convictions or emphasis on economic 
sovereignty. According to Frances Abele, the second half of the twentieth century perpetuated 
the “national policy” model for northern socioeconomic development.242 This model, 
typically characterized by boosterism for Arctic sovereignty and national urgency, has 
reemerged intermittently since the early 1960s and has appropriated elements from 
Diefenbaker’s ambitious agenda. Did Diefenbaker’s ‘Vision’ capture a zeitgeist that would 
continue for the next half century or was the ‘Vision’ an innovative policy that inaugurated a 
new modern epoch for the Canadian north? This policy does bears some similarity to other 
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resource development strategies of the time, however, the ‘Northern Vision’ emerged from a 
distinct Canadian context and was designed to address emerging issues of the 1950s. 
Diefenbaker’s apparent ambition and vision for the Canadian north resonated with 
Canadians, and while it may be easily scoffed at as nationalistic rhetoric, Diefenbaker’s 
ideology of the North has transcended his own time. Moreover, the important issues which 
the ‘Northern Vision’ addressed - including northern development, the northward expansion 
of Canadian nationhood, Arctic sovereignty, economic sovereignty, and the vital question of 
Canada’s relationship with its Northern territory - continue to be prevailing issues for the 
Canadian government.
 On 26 July 2009, the Harper government contributed to Ottawa’s long-history of 
national polices of northern development. Canada’s Northern Strategy focuses on advancing 
numerous priority areas of northern development including promoting social and economic 
developments and, like Diefenbaker’s ‘Northern Vision,’ recognizes the vital benefit that the 
future of the Canadian north has for all Canadians.243 The Harper government is well aware 
of prior federal development strategies directed at the North and has consciously 
incorporated the philosophical tone and inspiration of Diefenbaker’s ‘Northern Vision’. In 
August of 2008, Harper announced plans for a new state-of-the-art polar icebreaker to named 
in honor of the late Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker, “I can think of no better name for 
the ship than the man who stood a few meters away from where I am standing today: John 
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George Diefenbaker. He understood that to truly fulfill our national dream, we must accept 
the challenges and seize opportunities presented by our North.”244 
 Like the ‘Northern Vision,’ time will tell whether the Harper government can achieve 
their bold vision for the Arctic. As Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon noted when 
the strategy was unveiled, “Policy is only as good as the action it inspires”.245 After the 
disproportionate amount of emphasis government policy has placed on militarization and 
security in recent years, the Northern Strategy is a valuable step in the right direction. The 
most identifiable lesson to be learned from Diefenbaker’s ‘Northern Vision’ is that national 
policies that promote northern development for the strict benefit of the Canadian private 
sector and which demur at the value in developing Northern settlements are certainly at 
greater risk to changes in the national economy and equivocal public support. Northerners 
have repetitively learned this lesson and have warned the federal government that its political 
decisions and northern development plans cannot depend on intermittent political support for 
northern concerns. Political imperatives and alarmism for Arctic sovereignty and northern 
economic development is not simply empty rhetoric, however, has been a persistent 
condition for the past half century. Ensuring that this bold strategy leads to deliverable 
outcomes will distinguish this policy from the northern development strategies of previous 
governments. We must heed the warnings and obstacles that have hindered northern 
development in the past if the Canadian government is indeed committed to fulfilling the 
national aspirations of the North that have endured for nearly 50 years.
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